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THE CHALLENGE OF DERIVATIVES*
SAUL S. COHEN**
INTRODUCrION
T is commonly remarked that there is no generally accepted mean-
ing to the term derivative.' To repeat: there is no agreement as to
which financial, commercial or hybrid financial/commercial contracts
constitute derivatives. 2 Thus, an area of business life encompassing
contracts with face or notional amounts3 between $14 trillion and $35
trillion, amounting to as much as three-fourths of the world's publicly
* This essay is adapted from the author's remarks given on December 8, 1994, at
the Fordham University Graduate Colloquium, 1994-95: Financial Services
Regulation at Mid-Decade.
** Member of the New York Bar. Adjunct Professor, Broker-Dealer Regulation
and Investment Banking, Fordham University School of Law. A.B. 1957, Columbia
University; LL.B. 1960, Yale University School of Law.
1. In this article, "derivative" and "derivatives" are used interchangeably except
where required by number. "The term 'derivatives' does not have any generally ac-
cepted meaning." Roger D. Blanc, Policy Issues Presented by Derivatives Trading, In-
sights, June 1994, at 10, 10. "[T]he term 'derivative' has been so overexposed that it
no longer has a meaningful definition." Karen Spinner, Debunking the Derivatives
Bogeyman, N.Y. Tunes, Oct. 30, 1994, § 3, at 9. "[T]here is a strong case for doing
away with the term 'derivatives' altogether. This word misleadingly lumps together
different classes of instruments, some of which are not 'derivative' at all." A Risky
Old World- Financial "Derivatives" Can Make It Safer, But the Word Itself is a Suita-
ble Candidate for Banning, Economist, Oct. 1, 1994, at 18. An alternative definition
of a derivative, as "simply a contract that either allows or obligates one of the parties
(the 'end-user') to buy or sell an asset," is overbroad and of limited usefulness be-
cause it fails to account for the purposes of these instruments. Henry T.C. Hu, Misun-
derstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of
Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 Yale LJ. 1457, 1464 (1993). Consider the argument
that "[nlo entirely satisfactory definition of the term 'contract' has ever been de-
vised." John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts, § 1.1, at 1 (3d
ed. 1987). Blanc notes that the term "derivatives" includes, in addition to securities
options and commodity futures (which are based largely on the value of underlying
securities and thus clearly "derivative"), floaters and principal or interest-only instru-
ments (which are "stripped" from debt instruments) as well as commercial contracts
in which one party "swaps" with another certain obligations relative to interest rates
or securities markets fluctuations. See Blanc, supra, at 10. Essentially, derivatives fall
into two broad categories: those designed to manage risk-to hedge-and those
designed to accept risk to create higher return-to speculate. See infra part I.B. (de-
fining derivative instruments by example).
2. "Hybrid instruments contain elements of depository instruments or securities
and futures or commodity options. Some of these instruments enable issuers to both
raise capital and to manage risk." Report of the Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, OTC Derivatives Markets and Their Regulation 19 n.7 (1993) [hereinafter
CFTC Report]. The Report is an excellent (though becoming quickly dated)
sourcebook on derivatives.
3. Notional principal amount is the value of the underlying instrument-a stock,
bond, currency or money-market instrument on which the derivative instrument is
based. Barbara D. Granito, Assessing the Size of the Market, Wall St. J., Aug. 25, 1994,
at A4. See infra text accompanying note 81 (noting that risk exposure of a derivative
is usually only a fraction of the notional principal amount).
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traded equity securities, bonds, money-market funds and currencies
combined, operates without definitional borders.4 For we lawyers,
who spend our lives exploring the interstices in all relationships, defin-
ing a derivative is a source of intellectual challenge (and income) inas-
much as a derivative's legal definition dictates whether it will be
treated under the securities laws or under another regulatory regime.
Definitional tension surrounding derivatives, instruments whose re-
turns are "derived" from changes in the value of other assets, includ-
ing securities, also concerns government officials and members of the
financial press; to the derivatives market, definitional blur has pro-
vided protection for growth.
The recent losses of Barings PLC,5 Orange County, California, 6 Es-
cambia County, Florida,7 Proctor & Gamble,' Gibson Greetings,9
4. The broad range attributed to what are termed derivatives is apparent in at-
tempts to measure the size of the market. The $35 trillion figure is taken from a
comprehensive analysis of derivatives. Granito, supra note 3, at A4. The Journal
noted that its figures are "approximate," id., and estimated interest-rate and currency
swaps to represent more than one quarter of all derivatives. Significantly, over-the-
counter ("OTC") derivatives (excepting those on securities that were not estimated)
amounted to 70% of all derivatives. Id. Another source estimated interest-rate and
currency swaps at $6.2 trillion and $0.9 trillion respectively. Graham Bowley, How
Borrowers Cut Funding Costs, Financial Tumes (London), Nov. 16, 1994, at IX; see
also CFTC Report, supra note 2, at 16-18 (describing limitations on collecting accu-
rate information regarding derivatives). The CFTC Report also notes the lack of defi-
nitional borders in this area: "As the OTC derivatives marketplace does not consist
of a distinct category of products having common characteristics, there is no single
regulatory treatment applicable to all such products." I& at 87; Data on Derivatives
Offered, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1994, at D16 [hereinafter Data on Derivatives] (estimat-
ing the derivatives market at $14 trillion).
5. Meltdown, The Sunday Times (London), Mar. 5, 1995, at 11-14 (special sec-
tion) (reporting "[h]ow an entire financial system failed to stop a trader's mad gamble
that flushed Barings bank into oblivion"); Sara Webb et al., A Royal Mess-Britain's
Barings PLC Bets on Derivatives-And the Cost Is Dear, Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1995, at
Al (estimating losses by the Bank from trading futures contracts pegged to the Nikkei
225 Index at $950 million).
6. Leslie Wayne, $1.5 Billion Loss Seen For County, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1994, at
Dl (reporting a statement on December 1, 1994, by Robert Citron, the Orange
County Treasurer, announcing losses from investing in inverse floaters (defined infra
note 72)). The Orange County debacle engaged the country's attention in December
1994. County Treasurer Robert L. Citron's aggressive strategy of betting on lower
interest rates, successful for over 15 years, suddenly became a disaster as interest rates
continued to rise. See Sarah Lubman & John R. Emshwiller, Before the Fall: Hubris
and Ambition in Orange County: Robert Citron's Story, Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 1995, at
Al. Every aspect of the Orange County matter underwent scrutiny, and accusations
and recriminations plagued both the "usual suspects"-the County's officials, bro-
kers, underwriters, lawyers, accountants-and even the SEC itself. Mark Platte &
Matt Lait, SEC Could Have Averted Crisis, Supervisors Say, L.A. Tunes, Dec. 17,
1994, at Al. The County subsequently filed for bankruptcy, and Wall Street dealers
found another way to make money by restructuring and selling the County's faltering
portfolio. See Saul Hansell, Wall St. Rescue Squads also Turn a Tidy Profit, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 20, 1994, at D8.
7. G. Bruce Knecht, The Aftermath: Hit by Derivatives, Florida County Tries to
Decide What to Do, Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1995, at Al (discussing the county's losses
from investments in collateralized mortgage obligations ("CMOs")).
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Odessa Community College,10 three banks in the Federal Farm Credit
System," the State of Wisconsin,' 2 various small cities and towns,' 3
the Shoshone Indian Tribe of Wyoming,14 several money-market
funds,"S Askin Capital Management 6 and others' 7 have highlighted
8. Procter & Gamble reported that it had lost $157 million before taxes ($102
million after taxes) as a result of derivatives transactions. A shareholder derivative
action for corporate waste was brought against P & G's officers and directors as a
result of the losses. See Joanne Medero et al., Investing in Derivatives: Current Litiga-
tion Issues, Insights, Nov. 1994, at 5 (citing Drage v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No.
A9401999 (Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County, Ohio, filed Apr. 25, 1994)).
Medero provides an excellent discussion of this and other derivatives-related litiga-
tion. See id. P & G, which filed suit against Bankers Trust in October 1994 after
suffering losses from a Bankers Trust interest-rate swap with the Bank, recently
amended its complaint to include a Deutschemark swap with Bankers Trust. First
Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages, Procter & Gamble Co. v.
Bankers Trust Co., No. C-1-94-735 (S.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 6, 1995); G. Bruce Knecht, P
& G Amends Lawsuit Naming Bankers Trust, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1995, at A3 (noting
that P & G routinely purchases derivatives to hedge against currency and interest-rte
risk).
9. Gibson Greetings reported that it had lost $23 million from derivatives trans-
actions with Bankers Trust and sued the Bank in what, according to The Wall Street
Journal, is the first case by an American corporation to recover OTC derivatives
losses. Gibson alleged that Bankers Trust failed to "reveal the material risks and
misrepresented the nature of the transactions and thereby deceived and defrauded"
the company. Steven Lipin, Bankers Trust Sued on Derivatives, Wall St. J., Sept. 13,
1994, at C1. Bankers Trust responded that Gibson had understood the risks, that is,
Gibson sought to take "a position as to the direction that interest rates might move
and that Gibson [knew it] would suffer losses if its predictions were wrong." Saul
Hansell, Challenged Bank Defends Its Derivatives Actions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1994,
at D4. Bankers Trust settled the case, absorbing two-thirds of the loss. Stephen Lipin,
Gibson Greetings Reaches Accord in Suit Against Bankers Trust Over Derivatives,
Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1994, at A2. The case triggered investigations by the Federal
Reserve Bank, the SEC and CFTC into whether Gibson violated securities laws while
engaging in those derivatives transactions. Mark H. Anderson & Jeffrey Taylor, SEC
Investigating Derivatives Trades At Gibson Greetings, Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1994, at
C27. See infra notes 133 and 143 and accompanying text.
10. Odessa College, a West Texas community College, lost more than $10 million
trading derivatives. G. Bruce Knecht, I Owe U.: How A Texas College Mortgaged Its
Future In Derivatives Debacle, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1994, at Al (profiling the activities
of the College and its unusually sophisticated vice president for finance).
11. Losses on Derivatives Taken By Three Banks In Farm Credit System, Wall St.
J., Nov. 16, 1994, at A5 [hereinafter Farm Credit System] (reporting that three banks
that are part of the Farm Credit System had lost $23 million in 1994 from derivatives
investments, including structured notes). The president of the Federal Farm Credit
Banks Funding Corporation was quoted as saying that derivatives are "'very sound
tools when used properly.'" Id
12. Peter Truell, Wisconsin Has Big Loss In Derivatives, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24,
1995, at D1 (noting losses by the State of Wisconsin from speculating on the Mexican
peso and European currencies).
13. See Medero, supra note 8, at 7-8 (discussing local governments' authority to
enter into risky derivatives transactions); Leslie Wayne, Local Governments Lose Mil-
lions In Complex and Risky Securities, N.Y. Tunes, Sept. 25, 1994, § 1, at 1 (describing
losses at several local government units resulting from mortgage derivatives).
14. Wayne, supra note 13, § 1, at 1.
15. See, e.g., Kidder Backs Fund Losses, N.Y. Tunes, Sept. 1, 1994, at D2 (report-
ing losses from investments in variations of mortgage-backed securities by five Kidder
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the difficulties associated with classifying derivatives within the ex-
isting framework for securities regulation. Such losses have intensi-
fied the public scrutiny of derivatives, but unfortunately, media
coverage has added little to inform the debate over these instruments.
Indeed, the conventional wisdom is that "derivatives are the riskiest
securities ever devised."'8 Such characterization has only added to
federal lawmakers' urge to construct an elaborate regulatory frame-
work for derivatives.
This Article attempts to dispel some of the myths surrounding de-
rivatives. What follows below is an example of how a derivative con-
tract challenges traditional regulatory classification, a survey of the
different types of instruments commonly classified as such and a dis-
cussion of the risks and advantages associated with their use. Next,
this Article addresses the question of whether Congressional regula-
tion is appropriate in light of the developing self-regulatory apparatus.
After weighing the different approaches to regulation, this Article
concludes that additional federal regulation of derivative securities
would be expensive and counterproductive. Whether a derivative in-
strument is appropriate for a particular end-user ultimately depends
upon an entity's management and internal controls, not upon regula-
tory policy.
Peabody money-market funds); Bruce Knecht, Piper Manager's Losses May Total
$700 Million, Wall St. J., Aug. 25, 1994, at C1 (reporting losses suffered by the Piper
Jaffray-sponsored Institutional Government Income Portfolio Fund from investments
in CMOs); Georgette Jasen & Jeffrey Taylor, Derivatives Force First Closure of Money
Fund, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1994, at Cl (reporting the liquidation of Community Bank-
ers U.S. Government Money-Market Fund, "the first fund to liquidate because of
derivatives losses"); Leslie Wayne, Investors Lose Money In 'Safe' Fund, N.Y. Tunes,
Sept. 28, 1994, at D1 (listing 15 money-market funds whose advisors paid into the
funds to offset shortfalls from losses due to investments in derivatives, rather than
allowing fund share prices to fall below $1).
16. The Askin debacle is described, among other places, in an excellent primer on
mortgage-backed securities. Seth T. Taube & Lori S. Whittaker, Insecurities?: Why
Mortgage-Backed Securities are Tricky at Best, Bus. L. Today, Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 32.
Askin, a hedge fund that was managing $2 billion, invested in CMOs and became the
first of the 1994 derivative-related hedge-fund disasters. Other hedge funds had signif-
icant derivatives-related losses in 1994. Laura Jereski, Good Connections Put Hedge
Fund in Business But a Bad Bet Sank It, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1994, at Al (noting losses
by a London-based hedge fund run by David Weill, who had managed $1.2 billion for
wealthy clients from around the world).
17. According to expert observers, the losses outlined above, see supra notes 5-16
and accompanying text, were caused primarily by the reversal of the steep yield curve
(shorter rates much lower than long-term rates) that had prevailed in the early nine-
ties. Floyd Norris, Man of the Year: High-Wire Artist Alan Greenspan, N.Y. Tunes,
Jan. 1, 1995, § 3, at 1. When the Federal Reserve Bank began to raise interest rates in
February 1994, those who had speculated on continuing low rates by borrowing short
term and selling long term lost heavily. "'There was a lot more speculation on the
yield curve than anyone imagined.'" Id. (quoting Edward Yardeni, Chief Economist
at C.J. Lawrence).
18. Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes (CBS News television broadcast, Mar. 5, 1995) (tran-
script available from Burrelle's Information Services).
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I. BACKGROUND
Attempting to define derivatives is very difficult because instru-
ments capable of bearing that label are infinitely protean; they evolve
too rapidly to be encompassed under any preexisting regulatory struc-
ture. Below is a simplified example that demonstrates this definitional
tension, along with a brief introduction to the different financial in-
struments that are commonly classified as derivatives, followed by a
review of the different entities that typically use derivatives.
A. Definitional Tension Surrounding Derivative Instruments
I am doing a lawyer's work. A client, a major dealer in securities,
has asked me to review a term sheet for a derivative contract that it
hopes will be viewed as an equity swap 19 rather than an option.20
Both swaps and options are classified as derivatives, though only the
latter are currently regulated.2 If the proposed individually tailored
transaction between the dealer and its customer is classified as an op-
tion, (in this case an over-the-counter option) it will be treated as a
security, and it is thus subject to regulation by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, whose concerns are capital formation, the main-
tenance of efficient and orderly secondary markets and investor
protection.' Over-the-counter ("OTC") options are also subject to
the position limit rules established by the National Association of Se-
19. A swap is an agreement between two parties to exchange streams of payments
over time. They fall into two primary categories: interest-rate and currency swaps.
An interest-rate swap protects a party to a floating-rate loan from interest-rate
changes. In a "plain-vanilla" interest-rate swap, the party obligated under a variable-
rate note agrees to pay a counterparty a fixed rate of interest on the underlying princi-
pal in exchange for the counterparty's promise to assume the variable-rate payments
to the obligee. The counterparty assumes the risk that rising interest rates will in-
crease payments due under the loan, in exchange for receiving the fixed-rate payment
from the obligor at a slightly higher-than-market value. See The Handbook of Deriva-
tive Instruments 162-63 (Atsuo Konishi & Ravi E. Dattatreya eds., 1991) [hereinafter
Derivative Instruments]. In an currency swap, party X agrees to deliver to party Y an
agreed-upon amount of foreign currency at a future date. The contract uses a fixed
exchange rate to determine party Y's cost for X's agreement to deliver the foreign
currency, and the rate may be slightly higher then the prevailing exchange rate at the
time that X and Y sign their swap agreement. The agreement thus protects Y from
exchange-rate risk, which X assumes in return for requiring Y to pay at a rate slightly
higher than the prevailing exchange rate. Thus, unlike the interest-rate swap, where
only the interest payments are actually exchanged between the parties to the swap
agreement, the currency swap requires exchange between the parties of the full no-
tional amount of the contract. See i at 155-56.
20. An option can be exchange-traded or a customized OTC instrument. In either
case, an option grants to the holder the right, but not the obligation, to purchase an
underlying security at some point in the future. Black's Law Dictionary 1094 (6th ed.
1990).
21. See infra part I.B.
22. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1988).
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curities Dealers.' Simply put, given the size of the proposed transac-
tion, if it is viewed as an option it will violate these position limits and
will be illegal. On the other hand, if the transaction is merely viewed
as a private swap contract between two parties, it is "home free all";
the contract is exempt from any regulatory regime. The legal con-
cerns are then largely those arising under the common law: agree-
ment on terms and capacity to act. 4
Thus, there is great definitional tension in this area; parties and in-
struments are subject to a sort of Heisenberg principle-changing
meaning by reference if not by observation. First the parties: my cli-
ent is a registered broker-dealer and is subject to the entire panoply of
the federal, state and so-called self-regulatory apparatus.2 The party
on the other side of the transaction can be characterized as a "cus-
tomer," "counterparty," or even more independently, an "end-user"
or "participant." 6
23. National Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Rules of Fair Practice, art. III,
§ 33(a),(b)(3)(A)(4) & (5), N.A.S.D. Guide (CCH) J 2183 (Oct. 1994) [hereinafter
Rules of Fair Practice].
24. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 1, § 1-6, at 13 ("[T]he basic law of contracts
is not codified. Contract law is thus primarily common law, embodied in court
decisions.").
25. My client is regulated by the various self-regulatory organizations of which it is
a member, including the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), which
regulates all broker-dealers, the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), the Chicago
Board Options Exchange ("CBOE"), various regional stock exchanges and the regu-
latory agencies of all the jurisdictions in which it is registered, including the SEC.
26. What the other party to a derivative contract is termed bespeaks not only re4-
ulatory but ethical considerations. It is a longstanding SEC policy that a dealer is
"under a special duty ... not to take advantage of its customers' ignorance of market
conditions." Hughes v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943) (holding that a dealer
that actively solicited customers and then sold them securities at above-market prices
committed fraud), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944). Thus, the more attenuated de-
nominations-"counterparty," "end-user" and "participant," though descriptively ac-
curate, may offer economic and regulatory protection to dealers. See Federal Reserve
Bank of N.Y., Wholesale Transactions Code of Conduct § 1.1 (Draft Jan. 17, 1995)
[hereinafter Wholesale Transactions Code] (reflecting this tension in the technology
by using the neutral term "Participant"). The Code, coordinated by the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York, is a joint effort by the Emerging Markets Traders Associa-
tion, the Foreign Exchange Committee of the New York Fed, the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association, the New York Clearinghouse Association, the Public
Securities Association and the Securities Industry Association. It has been circulated
among various groups that participate in OTC financial markets. The final draft of
the Code will likely be released under the name Wholesale Transactions Best Prac-
tices. See Swaps Leader Expects Code of Conduct by Summer, Redemption Dig. &
Sec. Indus. Daily, Feb. 23, 1995, at 2; Jeffrey Taylor, Securities Firms Agree to Set
Controls on Derivatives, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1995, at C1 (noting that six of Wall
Street's largest derivatives dealers voluntarily agreed to make regular disclosures to
the SEC and CFTC about how they manage their derivatives risks). These banks also
agreed to give written risk assessments to companies to which they sell derivatives. Id.
The agreement with the SEC and CFTC addresses the same ethical concerns at issue
in characterizing a party to a derivatives transaction as "customer," "counterparty,"
"end-user" or "participant" because it acknowledges that dealers owe "customers" an
ethical duty to disclose risks.
1998 [Vol. 63
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The term sheet reflects the following: an institutional customer of
the dealer-an unregulated investment partnership familiarly referred
to as a hedge fund' 7-owns 2.7 million shares of stock traded on the
New York Stock Exchange, which it seeks to hedge over a four-year
period against loss. The dealer and hedge fund propose to enter into a
non-transferable, that is, not tradeable, contract with performance
commencing in June 1995. The contract provides that the customer
will, on the fourth anniversary, pay the dealer eighty-one percent of
the upside if the stock (now trading at 24) rises above $31.40. The
dealer will pay the customer the difference between the then-existing
stock price and $20.80 in the event the stock falls below $20.80. The
contract refers to these prices as Reference Prices One and Two.
Under the agreement, dividends on the shares remain with the cus-
tomer and reduce any payment that the dealer may have to make to
the customer, but increase the amount the customer may have to pay
to the dealer if the stock increases in value.
I am not expecting the reader to follow each of these terms nor
should the reader luxuriate in their texture. Rather, note the individu-
ality of what has been designed. The contract, an OTC derivative, is
unlike the most common derivative, an exchange-traded standardized
option. With a standardized option, one contract equals the right, but
not the obligation, of a contract owner to purchase from, or sell to, a
contract seller one hundred shares of an underlying equity security for
a period expiring on a uniform date at a specific price.' In this case,
however, the contracting parties, with the help of computer models,
have created a set of mutual obligations tuned so finely that after four
years one or the other (or neither if the security's 1999 market price
27. Hedge funds are typically unregulated investment limited partnerships, which
maintain exemption from federal securities laws by complying with § 4(2) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1988), and Regulation D- Rule 506, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.506 (1994). Shares in hedge funds are privately offered on a limited basis, often
to wealthy individuals. Despite their cautious-sounding name, such funds are often
highly leveraged. Jereski supra note 16, at Al. Hedge funds are managed by regis-
tered and unregistered general partners who commonly receive a management fee to
cover expenses and a percentage of profits. Conner Mlddelmann, Down But Not Out,
Financial Times (London), Nov. 16,1994, at DC The Financial Times of London re-
ported that there are 800-900 hedge funds worldwide with total capital estimated at
$75-80 billion, of which about 35% is managed by fewer than 10 managers. "Origi-
nally, hedge funds were US equity funds which 'hedged' against market declines by
holding short, as well as long, positions. In recent years ... funds started using lever-
age and derivatives to enhance returns and taking large bets on the direction of mar-
kets." Id.
28. See, e.g., Rules of Fair Practice, supra note 23, 1 2183, art. 1I, § 33(b)(2)XE)
("[A]n option to purchase or sell common stock shall be deemed to cover 100 shares
of such stock at the time the contract granting such option is written"); id
§ 33(b)(2)(L) ("The term 'series of options' means all option contracts of the same
class of options having the same exercise price and expiration date and which cover
the same number of units of the underlying security or index.").
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falls between the two Reference Prices) will profit or have their loss
potential reduced.
Although the usefulness of this instrument to the institution's port-
folio manager lies in its economic advantage rather than in its regula-
tory classification, regulators approach the transaction differently.
Exchange-traded and OTC options are limited as to position size out
of concern, derived from the physical or commodity markets that they
originated in, that someone could corner a market, thereby exacting
monopolistic profits from other traders.29 Accordingly, regulatory
classification is an important concern for the client and what it is I am
being paid to determine.3 °
B. Instruments Commonly Described as Derivatives
One of my clients describes derivatives as "any financial product
that is difficult to understand." Derivatives are most commonly de-
fined as "financial arrangements whose returns are linked to, or de-
rived from, changes in the value of stocks, bonds, commodities,
currencies,"'31 interest rates, stock indexes or other assets. As the ex-
ample above demonstrates, classifying a particular instrument may be
difficult. In the abstract, derivatives encompass traditional securities
such as corporate, municipal and mortgage bonds that have derivative
features, that is, cash flows linked to the price of equities, currencies
or commodities.32 Derivatives also include exchange-traded instru-
ments, such as options33 and futures,3 with standardized contracts for
29. II Philip M. Johnson, Commodities Regulation § 5.03 (1982). There have been
attempts to corner commodities markets in the past. For example, Nelson Hunt and
his brother Herbert helped to force silver prices to record levels by taking delivery of
huge amounts of silver and buying futures contracts for more in the late 1970s. G.
Christian Hill, Hunts Own 59 Million Ounces of Silver Despite Their Promise 4 Years
Ago to Sell, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1984, at A2. Then-Fed Chairman Paul Volcker testi-
fied before Congress on April 30, 1980, that "continued concentration of a massive
silver position in the hands of one family or institution is fundamentally unhealthy for
the performance of the markets." Id. In fact, the CFTC investigated whether the
Hunt Brothers illegally manipulated the price of silver and silver futures contracts in
1979 and 1980. IL
30. I am reminded of Professor Milsom's dictum: "The Law is a reiterated failure
to classify life." S.F.C. Milsom, A Pageant in Modern Dress, 84 Yale L.J. 1585, 1585
(1975) (reviewing Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974)).
31. Taylor, supra note 26, at C1.
32. Chris Kentouris, Talking Derivatives: This Really Isn't Nuclear Physics, Just
Plain Math and Common Sense, Redemption Dig. & Sec. Indus. Daily, Sept. 7, 1994,
at 3 (reporting an interview with Lester Wigler, who advises institutions on the man-
agement of derivatives operations). Wigler reviews several practical applications of
derivative instruments. Id.
33. An option may be exchange-traded or a customized OTC instrument. See
supra note 20.
34. Futures and forward contracts both obligate the holder to buy or sell a specific
underlying asset at a specified price, quantity and date in the future. Whereas for-
wards are privately negotiated OTC contracts, futures are exchange-traded instru-
ments. U.S. General Acct. Off., Financial Derivatives: Actions Needed to Protect the
2000 [Vol. 63
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size, maturity and delivery.15 Finally, the term "derivatives" embraces
OTC instruments, which are privately-negotiated, customized con-
tracts designed to meet the specific needs of counterparties. 6 OTC
derivatives include options,37 forwards,38 swaps,39 swaptions, 40 caps,
floors and collars.41 All three categories have existed for periods
ranging from years to centuries,4 2 but only the last, which includes
computer-designed hybrids4 3 of forwards, options and swaps, the ex-
otic derivatives such as leveraged swaps and structured notes (approx-
Financial System 26 (1994) [hereinafter GAO Report). Both are used primarily to
hedge against future fluctuations in interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates and
commodities. For example, an American party to a contract that requires payment to
the other party in foreign currency at a future date may arrange a forward or future
contract for the purchase of that foreign currency, to guard against a change in the
exchange rate between the signing of the contract and the payment date. Counterpar-
ties may profit through these instruments by speculating on changes in interest rates
or currency exchange rates. Id. at 26-27.
35. See Kentouris, supra note 32, at 3.
36. See id.
37. See supra note 20.
38. See supra note 34.
39. See supra note 19.
40. "Financial engineers in New York" created the swaption in 1987. The swap-
tion, simply an option on a swap, combines the characteristics of a swap and an op-
tion, giving a party the right to enter into a swap if it chooses to, without forcing an
immediate decision. Institutional investors favor swaps because they enable hedging
when there is uncertainty as to the direction of interest rates. Gregory J. Miliman, The
Vandals' Crown: How Rebel Currency Traders Overthrew the World's Central Banks
181 (1995).
41. Caps, floors and collars are all interest-rate products. A cap requires
one party (the "purchaser") [to pay] to the other (the "seller") a "premium"
for the seller's promise to pay to the purchaser the excess of a floating rate
of interest (such as LIBOR, commercial paper, the prime rate, Treasury
Bills, or certificates of deposit) applied to a notional principal amount over a
fixed rate applied to the same notional principal amount during the term of
the contract.
Wfllard B. Taylor et al., Interest Rate, Equity and Commodity Swaps, and Other No-
tional Principal Contracts, in Swaps and Other Derivatives in 1994, at 547, 564 (PLI
Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Ser. No. B-848, 1994). With a floor, "the pur-
chaser pays the seller for the seller's promise to pay to the purchaser the difference
between a floating rate applied to a notional principal amount and a fixed rate ap-
plied to the same notional principal amount to the extent the floating rate is below the
fixed rate." Id at 564-65. A collar sets both "a ceiling and a floor on floating rate
interest expense." Id. at 565.
42. The first known use of derivative instruments occurred in Bahrain about 2000
B.C., where merchants engaged in futures transactions for goods bound for barter in
India. Adam R. Waldman, Comment, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk. Innovative
Finance or the Dance into the Abyss?, 43 Am. U. L. Rev. 1023, 1027 n.20 (1994).
43. A hybrid security is a complex security consisting of virtually any combination
of two or more risk management building blocks: a swap, forward, future or option.
GAO Report, supra note 34, at 26. Structured notes, for example, are issued by gov-
ernment-sponsored enterprises and pay interest that fluctuates based on indexes of
interest rates, options or contracts that lock in future interest rates. See Farm Credit
System, supra note 11, at AS.
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imately two percent" of all derivatives in notional value-and
products of the 1990s), scare anyone silly.
Returning to my client's issue, options and equity swaps are gener-
ally considered to be derivatives because their core value ultimately
derives from other instruments, in this case a common stock. In a
sense, swaps and options serve many of the same purposes across a
broad range of investment needs.45 I must review my client's term
sheet to differentiate in terms of an enforceable agreement between
the "good" equity swap, which would allow two consenting, sophisti-
cated institutional contracting parties to apportion risk and reward as
they wish, or the "bad" option, which, given the size of this transaction
(2.7 million shares or 27,000 one hundred share contracts), would ex-
ceed position limits and would be illegal. Under the latter classifica-
tion, it would be illegal notwithstanding my client's lack of intent to
affect, let alone corner, the market.
At this point the reader should envision a piece of paper with a
vertical line drawn down the center and should place key attributes of
an option on one side and attributes of a swap on the other. Attrib-
utes of an option include: (1) an option holder is not obligated to
exercise the option; (2) an option requires payment of a premium for
the creation of the option contract; and (3) an option provides an ele-
ment of leveraged profit potential because the purchase price of the
option is likely to be a fraction of the value of the underlying security.
On the other side of the line, an equity swap is (1) non-volitional-
self-executing; (2) it does not require any premium (or at least no
quantifiable premium); and (3) the swap provides no leverage.
A complete analysis further differentiates the swap from other hy-
brid derivatives46 such as caps, floors and collars.47 After reviewing
my client's term sheet, I can conclude that, given the state of the law
then prevailing, the lack of manipulative potential or leverage in the
arrangement, and the fact that the transaction is self-executing, the
transaction, although intrinsically similar to an option, is not an op-
tion. It is therefore not a security and accordingly does not involve
the securities laws, the SEC or the NASD.48
My point in elaborating on this derivatives transaction is to accli-
mate the reader to modern financial realities. Modernity has been
44. Randall Smith & Stephen Lipin, Beleaguered Giant. As Derivatives Losses
Rise, Industry Fights to Avert Regulation, Wall St. J., Aug. 25, 1994, at Al.
45. Both instruments are useful for shifting financial risk from a party less willing
to bear it to party willing to assume that risk. See infra part II.
46. See supra note 43.
47. See supra note 41.
48. In our review of the term sheet, we noted that the SEC would likely deem
similar swap arrangements to be options for regulatory purposes at its earliest oppor-
tunity. Not surprisingly, the Commission did so before the end of 1994. BT Sec.
Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 35136 [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,477, at 86,112 n.6 (Dec. 22, 1994).
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explained as beginning when the "sum [of human knowledge] grew to
exceed the human capacity to understand it."4 9 As to derivatives,
therefore, we are all modem.
C. Players in the Derivatives Markets
The parties to the term sheet that I have reviewed are rational, so-
phisticated participants in the risk-shifting transactions that deriva-
tives facilitate: dealers that live to trade and investment partnerships
that live to speculate. Dealers include not only securities firms, 0 but
also insurance companies"' and the seven money center banks that
undertook ninety percent of bank derivative activity in their transfor-
mation as risk managers to corporate America.5 3 The players profita-
bly see "'a world of risks to be hedged out there . . . . [with]
derivatives [being] the modem way to hedge risks.' ,4
When one adds to the mix such end-user entities as money-market
funds, college endowments, municipalities and pension plans, as well
as corporate treasurers, the angst of modernity building in the past
several years becomes obvious: the assumption is that no one can un-
derstand derivatives. That being the case, they pose danger to their
users and therefore to the world's interconnected financial markets.55
Indeed, although derivatives-related losses rarely made headlines in
the past,56 the recent losses noted above" illustrate the purported
dangers of derivatives to users. Furthermore, Arthur Levitt, Chair-
49. Lawrence Norfolk, The Honesty of Pagemonsters, Times Lit. Supp. (London),
Sept. 2, 1994, at 6.
50. According to one study, the four major American securities firms involved in
derivatives dealing are The Goldman Sachs Group, LP., Salomon, Inc., Merrill Lynch
& Co. and Morgan Stanley Group, Inc. GAO Report, supra note 34, app. v, at 188.
51. The three largest American Insurance companies dealing in derivatives are
American International Group, Inc., The Prudential Insurance Company of America
and General Re Corporation. Id
52. The seven major American money center banks dealing in derivatives are
Chemical Banking Corporation, Citicorp, J.P. Morgan & Co., Bankers Trust New
York Corporation, The Chase Manhattan Corporation, BankAmerica Corporation
and First Chicago Corporation. Id.
53. Risks and Regulation of Financial Derivatives: Hearing Before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 19,
1994) (statement of Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States).
54. John R. Dorfman & Stephen Lipin, Don't Derive Too Much Hope from Bank-
ers Trus Some Say, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1994, at C1, C2 (quoting Chuck Freeman, a
fund portfolio manager referring to Bankers Trust). The authors note that Bankers
Trust is no longer a "traditional bank" because the majority of its earnings are from
trading in derivatives, currencies and bonds. Id. at C1.
55. See Hu, supra note 1, at 1462-63 (noting that many regulators and even some
bankers believe that bankers know too little about the risks that derivatives may pose
to a portfolio and that "[o]bservers agree that regulators know less than the bankers"
about derivatives).
56. Albany International, a small company selling fabrics used by papermakers,
made headlines in 1988 when it reported a $4 million loss on a swap transaction worth
$100 million. Millman, supra note 40, at 182.
57. See supra notes 5-17 and accompanying text.
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man of the SEC, predicted that a derivative-driven "accident" would
occur at some point, causing "'the failure of a large firm [that] could
have collateral effects throughout the market.' ,,8 Similarly, a Federal
Reserve Board study theorized that the default of a major derivatives
dealer with large exposures was more likely in a time of higher-than-
average volatility-when the dealer had made a series of bad "bets"
across various markets, rendering even a well-diversified portfolio
ineffective.59
Before I discuss the propriety of additional regulation of deriva-
tives, and more importantly, the risks associated with their use, it is
best to explain the benefits that relentlessly increase the use of
derivatives.
II. Ti PURPOSES OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS
Indeed, derivatives are sound tools when properly used. They are a
necessity of business planning for corporate treasurers; they reduce
currency risks for those engaged in foreign trade; and they reduce the
risks of interest-rate fluctuation to provide a level of financial insur-
ance for everyone.60 Notwithstanding Chairman Levitt's "inevitable
58. Levitt Says Standards On Affiliates Using Derivatives Due By Thanksgiving, 26
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1301, 1303 (Sept. 30, 1994) (reporting Levitt's testimony
before the Senate Banking Committee on September 28, 1994). In fact, the failure of
Barings, the English merchant bank, in February 1995, was exactly such an event, yet
it had no appreciable effects on the financial markets. See The Bank that Disappeared,
Economist, Mar. 4, 1995, at 11 [hereinafter Bank that Disappeared] ("Though stirred,
financial markets were not much shaken. Some might even say that the [Barings]
affair attests to their resilience"); Marcus W. Brauchli & Jeremy Mark, Barings Un-
likely to Tarnish Singapore Markets for Long, Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 1995, at Cl (noting
that there was no indication that the Barings fiasco would have any long-term effect
on Singapore's financial markets).
59. John Connor, Study Faults Risk Analysis of Derivatives, Wall St. J., Sept. 26,
1994, at B12B (reporting a Federal Reserve Board staff study by economist Gregory
Duffee that concluded that current methods of assessing the risks of investments in
derivatives may "underestimate future exposures substantially").
60. See Saul Hansell, Derivatives as the Fall Guy: Excuses, Excuses, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 2, 1994, § 3, at 1.
Are derivatives a high-tech, 1990's version of financial snake oil? Is there
anything inherently dangerous about them? The answer is a qualified "no,"
according to central bankers, economists, commercial bankers and the cor-
porations that use derivatives.
For big companies, in particular, these new financial instruments can be
efficient tools that lend greater stability to business operations. They help
companies with far-flung international operations reduce their risk from sw-
ings in currency values and from interest-rate movements abroad. Hedging
against those risks became a far more intricate game during the 80's as more
and more nations opened up their financial markets.
Id. The SEC itself has specifically recognized the utility of derivatives to business
operations. Accordingly, where it has regulatory authority, it has specifically ap-
proved of corporations entering into interest rate swaps, interest rate caps, collars and
floors. See National Fuel Gas Co., Supplemental Order Authorizing Trading of Inter-
est Rate Swaps, Exchange Act Release No. 35-26164, 1994 WL 665990 (Nov. 21,
1994). The use of derivatives in corporate takeovers, however, has already raised
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accident" comment and the Federal Reserve Board study mentioned
above, one should understand that derivatives lessen volatility by effi-
ciently shifting risk from parties less able or willing to bear it to others
with the resources to more readily absorb such risk in exchange for a
potential profit.6
The factors that explain the sudden growth in derivatives help to
demonstrate why they are useful when properly employed. First, the
advent of floating-rate financing decreased the cost of borrowing at a
time of low interest rates.62 Similarly, "sweeping internationalization
of trading of currencies, bonds and equities" created other financing
opportunities.63 These opportunities, however, also created risks: a
borrower who employed floating-rate financing would be bound to
escalating interest payments as market rates rose. Similarly, a manu-
facturer who contracted to purchase or sell materials from abroad at
discounts created by favorable exchange rates could find costs sud-
denly escalating as exchange rates shifted. Thus, there is the need to
hedge against such contingencies. "The primary purpose of [deriva-
tives] is not to borrow or lend funds but to transfer price risks associ-
ated with fluctuations in asset values."'  Today the demand for
hedging against such risks has transformed the application of interest-
rate, currency and commodity futures into a multifaceted discipline.'
Inhibiting regulation is not a realistic prospect because advantages
to users of complex customized derivatives are so apparent to ever
group that has any influence over the legislative-regulatory process.
Indeed, such regulation (as various observers have noted) would be to
a substantial degree counterproductive because it would raise the cost
regulatory concerns. George Sivell, Inquiry Into Use of Swaps in Bids, The Tunes
(London), Mar. 4, 1995, at 1 (discussing the British Takeover Panel's inquiry after the
successful hostile takeover of Northern Electric by Trafalgar House).
61. Derivatives Group Sees No Need for New Legislation, Redemption Dig. & Sec.
Indus. Daily, Oct. 28, 1994, at 2 [hereinafter Derivatives Group]; see also Leo Me-
lamed, Keeping Risk on Track, Futures Industry, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 11, 15 (quoting
Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, who noted that "[the eco-
nomic function of [derivatives] is to allow risks that formerly had been combined to
be unbundled and transferred to those most willing to assume and manage each risk
component"). In addition to shifting risk, derivatives have several other advantages.
Derivatives are often less expensive than investments in the underlying assets, and
they may also provide the opportunity for end-users to arbitrage differences between
the price of the derivative and the price of the underlying asset. Hu, supra note 1, at
1466.
62. Melamed, supra note 61, at 13.
63. Id.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. See generally Derivative Instruments, supra note 19 (discussing in detail inter-
est-rate and equity derivatives and investment, hedging and trading strategies).
66. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (discussing how the SEC and
CF1TC both took measures toward regulation of derivatives); infra note 133 (discuss-
ing the settlement between Bankers Trust and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
following large losses by Bankers Trust clients Gibson Greetings and Procter &
Gamble).
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of managing risk and could create market rigidities that impede the
responsiveness and resiliency of markets in times of financial stress.67
Additionally, such regulation would be largely moot, as businesses can
easily move offshore, beyond most regulatory control. More impor-
tantly, however, the different forms that derivative products can read-
ily take are limited only by the imagination of creative "financial
engineers"; they evolve too quickly to be encompassed in any kind of
regulatory net. As I will conclude, the challenge of derivatives is the
difficulty they pose to the orthodox and increasingly irrelevant regula-
tory structure to which we have grown accustomed.
III. RISKS ASSoCIATED WI THE USE OF DERIVATIVES
Yet there are snakes in Eden: just as derivatives can be a cheaper,
more effective substitute for other investment and financing instru-
ments, they can create risk or a path for portfolio managers to avoid
investment restrictions. For example, ELKs, Salomon's Equity
Linked derivatives,68 or the MITTs, SUNs and SIRS marketed by
dealers like Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Citicorp, 69 allow an
investor to receive a portion of the appreciation in a particular stock,
basket of securities or stock market index like the Standard & Poor
500. At the same time, these instruments ensure the return of the
investor's money plus fixed annual earnings. On the other hand, these
instruments also create a way for a more adventurous manager, whose
portfolio guidelines limit him to the purchase of dividend-paying com-
mon stocks, to, in effect, buy non-dividend-paying common stocks.70
Of course, a corporate treasurer may, to his own and his employer's
ultimate regret, see only a metaphysical line 71 between hedging risk
67. See Economists Roundtable Calls for No New Derivatives Rules, Redemption
Dig. & Sec. Indus. Daily, Oct. 3, 1994, at 2 [hereinafter Economists Roundtable] (not-
ing the view of the Financial Economists Roundtable, comprised of 33 economists
primarily associated with academic institutions). These commentators contend that
risks associated with derivatives are exaggerated and that banks, currently the largest
derivatives dealers, are already well-regulated. Id.
68. These instruments allow investors to forego appreciation above a certain
amount on a common stock in return for an interest payment based on the face value
of the stock. ELKs have a four-year maturity. Prospectuses are available from Salo-
mon Brothers; currently ELKs are issued on common stocks of Snapple Beverage,
Microsoft, Oracle Systems and Digital Equipment, among others. See also Greg Stein-
metz, A Derivative Tied To Snapple Shares Takes Sharp Drop, Wall St. J., Nov. 3,
1994, at A3 (noting that Salomon currently has 13 different issues of ELKs, with a
total market value over $800 million). These products are designed for stocks that
pay low dividends or none at all. In return for receiving an income stream, investors
in these products agree to relinquish some of the upside potential of the common
stock. See id.
69. Barry Rehfeld, Playing the Stock Market, Without Risk, N.Y. Times, Nov, 5,
1994, § 1, at 38 (discussing these various instruments).
70. See Steinmetz, supra note 68, at A3.
71. Dow Chemical of Midland, Michigan, appears to have mastered this balance.
With one-half of its income from foreign operations, Dow has sought to control the
effects of currency moves on its business and has established itself as a successful
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and using the same types of derivatives to create higher return. Just as
some securities pose higher risks than others, the risk involved with
the use of different derivative products varies significantly.
These concerns are our introduction to risk in derivatives.
When an investor buys shares of General Motors on the New York
Stock Exchange because he believes that the company will overcome
its problems and become as profitable as other car makers, his single
fear is loss of some or all of the investment. A speculator has the
exact same fear when he purchases an option-a derivative-on the S
& P 500 Index on the Chicago Board Options Exchange because he
believes that the stock market will rise, or when he buys an inverse-
floating-rate derivative' from a dealer because he has a "view" that
interest rates will move in a particular direction. In either case, the
analysis is of risk against possible reward. The analysis, however,
should not focus on investors who hedge or speculate, even in deriva-
tives. Instead, the focus must turn to the security underlying a partic-
ular derivative. When the highly sophisticated and previously
successful Treasurer of Orange County lost $1.5 billion largely in in-
verse floaters because he "bet" wrong on interest rates, it was the un-
derlying instruments, not the derivatives, that caused the loss." After
all, the Orange County Treasurer presumably had available to him the
currency trader, "at a time when even chief executives like Chrysler's Lee Iacocca
couldn't resist the temptation to blame the dollar-yen rates for poor car sales." Mill-
man, supra note 40, at 162.
72. An inverse floater is essentially a floating-rate bond whose coupon rate moves
in the opposite direction of a benchmark, for example, the London Interbank Offered
Rate ("LIBOR"). One author uses the following formula to demonstrate how an
inverse floater works:
YIELD = 30 - (4 x LIBOR)
If LIBOR is 7%, this inverse floater pays only 2% to the holder, if LIBOR falls to
5%, this floater pays 10%. James C. Van Home, Financial Market Rates and Flows
252 (4th ed. 1994). Properly used, an inverse floater is excellent for institutions with
variable-rate bond obligations to hedge against changes in interest rates. Id.
73. Lubman & Emshwiller, supra note 6, at Al (noting that Robert Citron, the
treasurer of Orange County, made highly-leveraged investments in inverse floaters
the centerpiece of his investment strategy). Returns on these instruments increase as
interest rates fall. Citron financed these investments through reverse-repurchase
agreements ("repos"), which allowed the County to sell a security while promising to
later buy it back at a higher price. Id. When interest rates rose, the County was left
with the obligations on the repos, though the returns on the inverse floaters dropped.
Id.; see also Andrew Davidson, Derivatives' Risk Related to Leverage, Wall St. J., Sept.
29, 1994, at A13 ("Derivatives are not necessarily more or less risky than the underly-
ing assets. The degree of risk is related to the degree of leverage."). Davidson notes
that any financial instrument poses some risk element and that the label "derivative"
should not be associated with high risk, but rather each individual derivative product
must be analyzed for its own risk potential. Id.; Spinner, supra note 1, § 3, at 9 (noting
that derivatives are essential instruments for any multinational corporation). "'Just
because these products can produce more dramatic losses than other instruments
doesn't mean they're inappropriate for municipalities.'" Jeffrey Taylor, SEC Is Prob-
ing Orange County on Two Fronts, Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1994, at A3 (quoting Brandon
Becker, Director of the SEC Market-Regulation Division).
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same computers, analytical tools and executive talent to examine and
employ derivatives as do the treasurer's departments at multinational
corporations like Dow Chemical,74 major banks and Wall Street deal-
ers. Therefore, the question is the propriety of a financial officer bet-
ting on interest rates, not whether that speculation was effected
through the leverage offered by derivatives. Simply stated, derivatives
shift risk from parties less able to absorb it to those more able or will-
ing to do so.
In essence, derivatives are responding to an entirely new class of
financial market participants-the late twentieth-century equivalent
of farmers protecting themselves against lower prices in future months
for their soybeans or pork bellies, or of refiners insuring reasonable
costs for the oil they will process or perhaps, at worst, of money man-
agers whose gambling instincts are limited to betting the favorite to
show in a four-horse race.75 We are focused on institutions seeking to
hedge certain financial matters inherent in their commercial activity;
portfolio managers seeking to increase their yields in basis points 6
rather than in full percentages and municipalities that can save ten
basis points on $600 million of a debt issuance. Such savings may
amount to $600,000 in a year but millions over the life of the debt, as
Los Angeles County officials recognize: in October 1994, the County
sold variable-rate bonds hedged with interest-rate swaps and other de-
rivatives.77 Yet paradoxically the risks faced by these cautious deriva-
74. See supra note 71.
75. In 1971 ... [m]ost [commodity] legal issues related to agricultural com-
modities and, to a lesser extent, to precious metals. Futures on such exotic
items as GNMA securities and Treasury bonds were only in the earliest con-
ceptual stages, and futures on stock indices were not even a gleam in the eye
of the most creative economist....
The participants in the futures and options markets now include far more
than farmers and metals merchants. Banks, savings and loan associations,
mutual funds, and pension funds already participate in those markets, and I
have no doubt that insurance companies will soon be a significant factor in
the markets.
Thomas A. Russo, Regulation of the Commodities Futures and Options Markets vii-
viii (1994); see also What Price Turkey Futures?, Economist, Dec. 24, 1994, at 96 ("The
world's biggest futures exchanges have their roots in farming .... After little more
than two decades [since 1972,] turnover in [financial futures] dwarfs trading in a.ricul-
tural contracts, which now account for only a quarter of total futures trading in
America.").
76. A basis point is a unit of measure for the change in interest rates for bonds and
notes. One basis point equals 0.01%, that is, 100 basis points equals one percent.
Dictionary of Business & Economics 40 (Christine Ammer & Dean S. Ammer eds.,
1984).
77. See Thomas D. Lauricella & Candace Cumberbatch, Big Municipal Bond Issu-
ers Turn to Derivatives In an Effort to Bring Down Borrowing Costs, Wall St. J., Nov.
9, 1994, at C21 (describing several municipalities, including Orange County, Califor-
nia, which have used interest-rate swaps to convert fixed-rate payment obligations
into variable-rate payment obligations). The article quotes one commentator as stat-
ing, "People have only been hurt [with derivatives] on the investment side and not on
the issuer side" and another commentator who stated that municipalities were pru-
dently using derivatives to hedge interest-rate exposure, "not as speculative instru-
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fives users come not solely from possible loss of investment or stake
but rather in battalions.
I have already alluded to the great risk, the risk that all but alarms
legislators and regulators and consumes the press: the risk that the
walls of the financial markets will come tumbling down because of an
ill-appreciated or unaddressed fault in the system itself-systemic
risk.78 I began by referring broadly to a range of derivatives in no-
tional value of $14 trillion to $35 trillion. Acknowledging the lack of
precision is important; it comes from an absence of a reporting mecha-
nism for derivative contracts. Notably, I mentioned notional value 79
this is the face amount of the contracts, a figure that exaggerates
risk.' The replacement value of these contracts is a more accurate
measure of risk; it is believed to run from one to six percent of face
ments." Id. The article does not address the use of derivatives to raise funds by
speculation, as was done in Orange County. But see Laura Jereski & Thomas T. Vo-
gel, Jr., Orange County Borrowed $1 Billion Even as Its Investment Losses Piled Up,
Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1994, at A3 (reporting that even after Orange County suffered
huge losses, the county and several municipal agencies borrowed vast sums to prop up
the failing fund); Truell, supra note 12, at D1 (noting losses by the State of Wisconsin
from currency speculation on the Mexican peso).
78. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting that the failure of Barings
did not have any significant collateral effects on financial markets). There are numer-
ous analyses of systemic risk. Se4 e.g., CFrC Report, supra note 2, at 90-122; Econo-
mists Roundtable, supra note 67, at 2 (noting that prominent financial economists
agreed that "[tihe use of over-the-counter derivatives 'does not justify the current fear
that they might cause a systemic meltdown.'" The Economists Roundtable also con-
cluded that "the often well-publicized losses from derivatives 'manifest primarily
managerial inadequacies rather than intrinsic problems in the over-the-counter deriv-
atives market.'" Id. See also Melamed, supra note 61, at 15 ("'Derivatives... do not
introduce risks of a fundamentally different kind or of a greater scale than those al-
ready present in the financial markets. Hence, systemic risks are not appreciably ag-
gravated.' " (quoting Paul Volcker, former chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank and
chairman of the Group of Thirty, a group composed of industry leaders, bankers,
central bankers and academics)); Oversight of Derivatives Moving At Acceptable Pac4
Fed's Phillips Says, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1313, 1313 (Sept. 30, 1994) [herein-
after Oversight of Derivatives] (noting that Federal Reserve Board Governor Susan
Phillips does not believe that derivatives pose danger to the financial markets);
Charles W. Smithson, Systemic Aspects of Default Risk, Prepared for Conference:
OTC Derivative Markets and Their Regulation (Oct. 27, 1993) (on file with author).
Edgar Meister, a senior Deutsche Bundesbank official, has suggested that there
should be "stress tests" and "crash scenario[s]" to measure potential system-wide
risks from derivative trading. German Central Banker Sees Need to 'Stress Test' Deriv-
atives, Redemption Dig. & Sec. Indus. Daily, Sept. 20, 1994, at 1. Stress testing is a
key recommendation of the Basle Committee, see infra note 119, pt. m, and the
Group of Thirty, see infra note 118, at 11-12; see also Leslie L Rahl, Caveat Emptor:
Lessons from the Derivative's Losses of 1994, Futures Industry, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 25,
26-27 (describing thoroughly the breadth of stress testing).
79. See supra note 3 (defining notional principal amount).
80. See CFTC Report, supra note 2, at 18 (noting that "in many OTC derivatives
transactions, notional principal is the nominal value used to calculate contract pay-
ments.... [R]isk exposure will tend to be a small fraction of the notional principal.").
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amount,"' or from $91 billion to $2.1 trillion. That is real money, of
course, but for perspective, remember that these contracts are with
many parties in many countries and the potential loss at the low end
equals a drop of two percent on the New York Stock Exchange on any
given day 2 and at the high end about fifteen percent of the value of
all global equity markets combined. s3 I am nonetheless able to quote
only a range because a lack of reporting also means that a reasonable
estimate of replacement value is unavailable.
Although no one can disprove the possibility that the failure of a
major dealer would destroy a leading financial market, which could
then carry over to all other financial markets, 84 neither can one dis-
prove the possibility that our atmosphere will be destroyed by a great
asteroid. Sensibly, therefore, as we go forward in daily life we ask our
scientists to learn more about asteroids. Because derivatives add im-
measurably to the strength of our finances and enterprise, we must
seek to understand their many discrete risks.8 5
The first risk is that internal controls are inadequate to prevent a
treasurer of a government unit or corporation from crossing that pre-
viously discussed metaphysical line 86 between (1) enhancing profit po-
tential and reducing the risk that an increase in interest rates will
81. The New York Times estimated replacement value, "what would be lost if the
other side of the contract defaulted," at 3-6% of notional principal amount. Hansell,
supra note 60, § 3, at 1. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association esti-
mated the mark-to-market value (calculating value by reference to the secondary
market for the product, as opposed to the original cost of entering into the contract)
of derivatives at 1-2% of notional amount. Derivatives Group, supra note 61, at 2.
82. See Securities Indus. Ass'n, 1994 Securities Industry Fact Book 23 (Grace Toto
& George Monahan eds., 1994) (on file with author). The $91 billion figure is arrived
at by taking two percent of the 1993 total capitalization of the NYSE, reported as
$4,545 billion. Id.
83. See id. at 40. The $2.1 trillion estimate is arrived at by taking 15% of the total
global equity markets capitalization for 1993, reported as $14,101 billion. Id.
84. See Bank that Disappeared, supra note 58, at 11 (noting that the failure of
Baring Securities after massive losses from trading futures contracts pegged to the
Nikkei 225 Index had no appreciable collateral effects on any of the world's financial
markets).
85. See Comptroller of the Currency, Risk Management of Financial Derivatives,
Comptroller's Handbook (1994) [hereinafter Comptroller's Handbook] (providing
extensive guidance to national banks and nationally chartered federal agencies on
management of risks from off-balance sheet derivatives); CFTC Report, supra note 2,
at 90-123 (providing a general discussion of derivatives-related risks); Davidson,
supra note 73, at A13 ("For debt-market derivatives the major sources of risk are
duration (a measure of interest-rate sensitivity), convexity (a measure of change in
duration), credit quality, spread, volatility, currency and asset-specific risks (such as
pre-payments for mortgage-backed securities)."); Joanne T. Medero, Derivatives Risk
Management Issues, in Handbook of Seminar, pt. II (National Soc'y of Compliance
Professionals, Oct. 5-6, 1994) (describing various risk categories and approaches to
controlling them).
86. See supra text accompanying note 71.
2010 [Vol. 63
CHALLENGE OF DERIVATIVES
affect payments on floating-rate debt obligations; and (2) being a
profit center in itself.'
The second risk is caused by a lack of understanding of the cost,
efficacy and loss potential of the product being employed. In simple
terms, customized derivatives are built with complex mathematics and
when losses occur the immediate reaction, as in the Orange County
matter, is that the entity must have lacked the expertise to make the
required analysis.88
Related to this is the third risk, that of an off-balance-sheet item-
the derivative contract-reducing without public awareness the in-
crease in value of an item on the balance sheet that the derivative is
intended to hedge.89
Fourth is operational risk; a party may not have adequate controls
to book and monitor the transaction, enabling it to stay informed of
the extent of its potential loss.'
Fifth is intellectual risk. Given the complexity of some instruments,
it is economically feasible for only relatively few individuals at a
company to understand such transactions, and if one or more leave,
the company's ability to manage its transaction risk will be
compromised.91
87. See Taylor, supra note 73, at A3 (noting remarks by SEC Commissioner Rob-
erts in the wake of the Orange County fiasco). Roberts stated that the propriety of a
municipality's derivatives purchases should be a matter for state and local legislation
rather than for the SEC. ld.
88. Lubman & Emshwiller, supra note 6, at Al (noting County Treasurer Citron's
claims that due to inexperience, he heavily relied on the securities dealers who sold
the County the ill-fated instruments). Citron's claimed inexperience, however, has
been widely disputed. See id. Notwithstanding claims that derivatives pose risks to
the financially unsophisticated, see, e.g., SEC Commissioner Wants Rules for Pension
Plans on Derivatives, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1421, 1428 (Oct. 28, 1994), the
Orange County, Odessa Community College and P & G debacles are clearly those of
sophisticated managers. See Lubman & Emshwiller, supra note 6, at Al; Knecht,
supra note 10, at Al; Medero, supra note 8, at 5. Many investors are aware of the
risks associated with certain derivatives. Emphasizing the complexity of some deriva-
tive instruments and the uncertainty involved with reliance on mathematical models
that attempt to evaluate relationships between securities, Addison L Piper, Chairman
of Piper Jaffray, a Minneapolis based brokerage firm, noted, "We got caught in a
market that we thought we understood." Knecht, supra note 15, at C1 (reporting
losses as high as $700 million from Piper Jaffray's "aggressive investments in deriva-
tives," including CMOs).
89. Shadow Financial Regulators Discuss Derivatives, Fair Trade, Branching, 26
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1301, 1317-18 (Sept. 30, 1994) [hereinafter Shadow Finan-
cial] (citing discussion on September 26, 1994, between reporters and Professor Ed-
ward J. Kane, Boston College, a member of the Shadow Financial Regulatory
Committee, noting that derivatives are off-balance-sheet activities and therefore a
bank may use a derivative product to hedge against another risky product in its port-
folio with only one part of that strategy being apparent; in other words," 'There is not
symmetry of gains and losses.' "); see infra note 117 (noting proposed changes in ac-
counting treatment of derivatives on balance sheets).
90. See Melamed, supra note 61, at 15.
91. See id. at 13 (noting the "radical technological advancement" that transformed
derivatives valuation into a multifaceted discipline).
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The sixth risk is legal in nature: There is always the possibility that
a derivative contract will be unenforceable because of a lack of au-
thority by the individual who committed a party to an agreement, as
two Chinese trading firms claimed after Lehman Brothers sued them
for their failure to repay loans of $53.5 million for foreign-exchange
transactions92-or as in the case where the House of Lords held that
an English municipality's entry into interest-rate swaps was ultra
vires93 -or that at a later point a regulator or court will find that the
contract itself, rather than the capacity of any party, violates a regula-
tion or law.94
The seventh, credit risk, is largely a concern of dealers; the end-user
or counterparty may be financially unable to meet the terms of the
contract or may become insolvent and default.95
Eighth, the enforceability of a contract in the event of a party's in-
solvency is uncertain, as, for example, in the recent Orange County
fiasco.
9 6
Ninth is event risk, which is the possibility that a political upheaval
or natural catastrophe will make completion of the contract
impossible.97
92. Michael Siconolfi, Legal Fight Between Lehman Brothers And China's
Minmetals Is Heating Up, Wall St. J. Mar. 10, 1995, at B16.
93. Hazell v. Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council, [1992] 2 App.
Cas. 1, 27-28, 37 (appeal taken from Q.B.) (noting that the swaps at issue were for
speculation, not for hedging); Miliman, supra note 40, at 250-52 (noting that Hammer-
smith and Fulham borrowed funds from the British government at low fixed rates and
then entered into swaps, a strategy that remained profitable until rates rose steeply in
1988); see also Andy Pasztor & Laura Jereski, Orange County Sues Merrill for $3
Billion, Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1995, at A3 (noting that the County's suit seeks to nullify
its derivatives transactions with Merrill by claiming that state legal precedent prohib-
its any municipality from incurring debt greater than that year's revenue without the
consent of two-thirds of the electorate); id at A10 (noting that Morgan Stanley is
currently appealing an order to pay to the State of West Virginia over $30 million
because of several reverse-repurchase agreements with the state later held to violate
state law); Leslie Wayne, Big Risks, Big Losses, Big Fight, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1995,§ 3, at 1 (noting that oral argument on the Morgan Stanley case before the West
Virginia Supreme Court begins on May 10, 1995).
94. See supra part I.B. (demonstrating by example how a financial instrument is
capable of different regulatory classifications, each with dramatically different impli-
cations for the parties involved).
95. See Hu, supra note 1, at 1468-69 (reviewing credit risk); infra note 126 (noting
steps taken by two commodity exchanges to reduce credit risk).
96. Michael Siconofi & Anita Raghavan, Wall Street Races to Sell $10 Billion in
Collateral, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1994, at A13 (discussing the concerns of brokerage firms
that held collateral for loans to Orange County and noting that "Orange County offi-
cials insist that the municipality's Chapter 9 bankruptcy-law filing ... prevents firms
from dumping the securities held as collateral for repurchase agreements with the
County"). At issue is whether § 559 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, which permits
holders of collateral under repurchase agreements to close out these contracts, applies
to a petition filed under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
97. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 1, §§ 13-1 to 13-28, at 535-84 (discussing
impossibility of performance).
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Tenth is the risk of early termination of the contract; this may re-
quire the counterparty to move from a variable rate to a higher fixed
rate or from a lower fixed rate to a higher variable rate.98
Eleventh is the uncertainty in various instruments of when prepay-
ments will occur;, this results in irregular cash flows.99
The twelfth risk is that derivative activity may affect a participant in
another market. For example, in August 1994, the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average closed up seventy points largely because trading in op-
tions on the American Stock Exchange Institutional Index prompted
options brokers to buy stocks on the New York Stock Exchange in the
last half-hour of trading.100 The options at issue in that case were
known as flex option contracts (contracts that can expire on any
agreed-upon day rather than on standard expiration days).' 0'
The thirteenth and final risk, at least for this analysis, is price behav-
ior in the market: customized derivatives are by their nature illiquid
instruments. They do not suit all parties in the market and therefore a
party to a customized derivatives contract may be unable to obtain
even a clearing price and thus would be unable to "exit" a position."
IV. REGULATION
The growth of derivatives in the past few years has not gone un-
remarked and analysis has not lacked willing hands.'0 3 In one comer
there are instruments that contracting parties are willing to deal with
in the common-law no-man's land beyond regulations-structured
notes,104 interest-rate and equity swaps,105 swaps with embedded op-
tions ("swaptions"),' ° issues with indexed caps'0 7 and collars.' °n In
the other comer are nervous central bankers, legislators and financial
98. Uncertainty as to when prepayments will occur is the primary risk associated
with mortgage-backed securities. If interest rates decline, a mortgagor may refinance
at a lower rate, forcing the investor in the related CMO to reinvest at the prevailing
lower interest rates. See Taube & Whittaker, supra note 16, at 34-35.
99. Id.
100. Floyd Norris, One Manager's Little Gamble Prompted Big Shift in Stocks, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 26, 1994, at Al.
101. See id.
102. See Medero, supra note 85, pt. IhB. ("Market risk is the price behavior of an
instrument when market conditions change. Liquidity risk is a subset of market risk
that also encompasses cash flow and the inability to exit or unwind a position."); Hu,
supra note 1, at 1468-69 (reviewing credit and market risk).
103. Indeed, major financial publications, including the Wall Street Journal, the Fi.
nancial 7Tunes, the New York Tmes, Insights and Institutional Investor have closely
covered derivatives-related developments. There are also several industry magazines,
including Derivatives Week, Derivatives Operations & Regulation, Futures Week and
Derivatives Engineering & Technology.
104. See supra note 43.
105. See supra note 19.
106. See supra note 40.
107. See supra note 41.
108. See supra note 41.
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regulators. And again, "rocket scientists" or "financial engineers" can
parse any financial situation with existing risk or profit potential to
create an instrument to help manage that risk for one party while the
counterparty accepts some or all of that risk, hoping to create higher
returns for itself or to control other risks. Nevertheless, many inter-
ested parties, including dealers themselves, are considering ap-
proaches to derivative risk that range from the good advice found on
needlework samplers, "Know Thy Counterparty" to legislation. As
stated by Representative Leach, Chairman of the House Banking and
Financial Services Committee, "[a] commonality of standards can't be
achieved without legislation." 1°9
Given the risks associated with derivatives, there are three regula-
tory possibilities. First, derivatives could be regulated through a sys-
tem of voluntary compliance by dealers, complemented by at least
eighty initiatives that various groups recently implemented.110 Sec-
ond, derivatives regulation could be subsumed under existing federal
securities laws. Third, Congress could regulate derivatives through
new legislative initiatives that call for special oversight committees.
Each of these options is examined below.
A. Indirect Regulation and Voluntary Dealer Compliance
Congress has consistently avoided direct regulation of derivatives,
preferring to regulate them indirectly through a regulatory nexus with
dealers, as, for example, with the Government Securities Act of
1986111 and the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992. 12 The for-
mer-enacted after the failure of three non-regulated government se-
curities dealers though repurchase-agreement fraud threatened to
undermine the financing of the federal deficit-requires registration
of government securities dealers with the SEC while prohibiting regu-
lators from applying securities industry standard-sales-practice rules.
The latter act reflects the increased anxiety over derivatives in a mar-
ket that has spread to smaller institutions and smaller investors. Ironi-
cally, that act focuses on sales practice rules while exempting the very
customized transactions that created such concerns.
Given the extensive list of meaningful risks underlying the use of
derivatives, few of which are found in everyday stock market trading,
it is not surprising that approaches to reduce risk have come from an
equally extensive group of industry, national and international inter-
109. Oversight of Derivatives, supra note 78, at 1315.
110. See infra notes 113-35 and accompanying text.
111. Pub. L. No. 99-571, 100 Stat. 3208 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
112. Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3950 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C.). In 1993, under the FrPA, the CFTC created an exemption from all but the
antifraud provisions of the Commodities Exchange Act for swaps that meet certain
criteria. Exemption of Swap Agreements, 17 C.F.R. §§ 35.1-35.2 (1994).
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ested parties, including contract participants themselves. A recent re-
port indicates that various groups took nearly eighty actions in 1993
and 1994 to reduce derivatives-related risk." 3
These groups include the United States Congress,' 4 the Treasury
Department,11 5 the President's Working Group on Financial Mar-
kets, 6 the Financial Accounting Standards Board"' and the Group
of Thirty."" Broken down by industry, for banks, the Basle Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision," 9 the Federal Reserve System, 20 the Of-
113. President's Working Group on Fm. Mkts., Financial Market Coordination &
Regulatory Activities to Reduce Risks in the Financial System in 1993-94, at 1 (1994)
[hereinafter President's Working Group].
114. See Oversight of Derivatives, supra note 78, at 1315 (noting that "the regula-
tory gap that allows insurance companies to engage in derivatives operations in sepa-
rate subsidiaries outside the purview of state insurance commissioners would be
closed by [federal] legislation").
115. The National Currency Act, which provided for the organization of national
banks, also established a separate bureau within the Department of the Treasury, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which has the authority to approve forma-
tion of national banks. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 93a (1988)). The OCC, jointly with the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC, an-
nounced new sales practice rules for banks that sell derivatives. See infra note 121.
116. See President's Working Group, supra note 113.
117. See Financial Accounting Standards Bd. ("FASB") Statement No. 119: Disclo-
sure About Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments
(1994) (calling for voluntary disclosure in financial statements of the amounts, nature
and terms of derivatives). The heightened disclosure obligations vary according to
whether the derivatives are held or issued for trading purposes or for purposes other
than trading, such as hedging. See Lee Berton, S&P Takes Rare Stand Against FASB
Over Plan to Assess Risk of Derivatives, Wall St. 3., Mar. 15, 1995, at A4 (discussing a
FASB proposal to require companies to list in their financial reports the current mar-
ket value of derivatives contracts that they buy, instead of carrying the contracts at
cost, as is currently permitted); Roberts Discusses Regulatory Developments With Re-
spect to Derivatives, The SEC Today, Nov. 10, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Roberts Dis-
cusses Developments] (noting that Commissioner Roberts, Chairman Levitt and
Federal Reserve Board Governor Susan Phillips are disappointed with the voluntary
nature of disclosure requirements under FASB Statement No. 119, and that the SEC
is considering guidance to supplement the FASB statement).
118. Global Derivatives Study Group, The Group of Thirty, Derivatives: Practices
& Principles (1993) [hereinafter Group of Thirty] (defining risk-management prac-
tices for derivatives dealers and end-users). The Group, headed by Alan Greenspan,
consists of prominent securities and banking professionals from around the world.
119. The Committee, which meets in Basle, Switzerland, consists of senior repre-
sentatives of bank supervisory authorities and central banks from 10 major countries
including the United States. See Basle Comm. on Banking Supervision, Risk Manage-
ment Guidelines For Derivatives 1 n.1 (Preface) (1994) [hereinafter Basle Commit-
tee] (on file with the author). The Guidelines "bring together practices currently used
by major international banks in a single framework." Id. '1 4.
120. The Federal Reserve System regulates state member banks and bank holding
companies. Among other actions, the Fed has proposed an increase in minimum capi-
tal standards for dealing with derivatives. See infra text accompanying note 150-51.
William McDonough, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, has
also warned bankers to implement risk management and internal control systems to
address derivatives. New York Fed Chief Warns Banks on Risks of Derivatives, Re-
demption Dig. & Sec. Indus. Daily, Sept. 19, 1994, at 3; see infra note 133 (discussing
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fice of the Comptroller of the Currency 1 ' and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation"z also took action. For securities and com-
modity dealers, domestically, the SEC,' 23 the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission, 24 the National Association of Securities Deal-
suitability actions and the Bankers Trust agreement with the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York).
121. The Federal Reserve Board, the OCC and the FDIC (which regulates state
non-member insured banks) jointly announced new sales practice rules for banks that
sell derivatives. The rules deal primarily with suitability matters and address CMOs
and structured notes. See Robyn Meredith, Regulators Act to Protect Derivatives Cus-
tomers, American Banker, Nov. 18, 1994, at 1.
122. See id.
123. The SEC has taken or considered action over a broad range of derivatives
regulation. The Commission implemented a risk assessment program following the
collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17h-1T (1994) ("Risk As-
sessment Recordkeeping Requirements for Associated Persons of Brokers and Deal-
ers"); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17h-2T (1994) ("Risk Assessment Reporting Requirements for
Brokers and Dealers"). The Commission has also proposed amendments to the net
capital rules addressing the pricing of listed options, and it has announced that it ex-
pects to adopt a unified computation of market risk capital charges along the lines
suggested by the Basle Committee. Roberts Reviews Current Regulatory Develop-
ments for Derivatives Products, The SEC Today, Nov. 21, 1994, at 1; see supra note
119. The SEC has launched investigations into use by public companies of deriva-
tives, see supra note 9 & infra note 143 (discussing Gibson Greetings), suggested
changes in disclosure for public issuers, see infra note 138, and issued a staff report
regarding the use of derivatives by mutual funds, focusing on disclosure of portfolio
risk profiles, how to quantify that risk and lowering existing limits on illiquid assets
including derivatives. The SEC has hectored the FASB and the NASD. See Roberts
Discusses Developments, supra note 117, at 1. The SEC and CFTC jointly fined Bank-
ers Trust $10 million in settling its investigation into Gibson Greetings. BT Sec. Corp.,
Exchange Act Release No. 35136 [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 85,477 (Dec. 22, 1994). The Commission has announced that it is consider-
ing changes in accounting rules for public companies involved in complex swaps trans-
actions. Abby R. Schultz & Jeffrey Taylor, SEC May Change Accounting Rules For
Derivatives, Wall St. J., Aug. 25, 1994, at A4 (discussing the proposed change, which
would require companies engaging in certain derivative transactions to recognize
gains and losses in the market value of these contracts on their earnings statements,
rather than carrying them at cost, as many companies currently do); see infra text
accompanying note 147. The SEC has amended Rule 10b-10 to supplement trade
confirmation disclosure and warning requirements regarding derivatives. See infra
text accompanying note 144. Perhaps most importantly, the Commission has consist-
ently emphasized the need for good management controls. Brandon Becker, Regula-
tory Talk, Compliance Rep., Nov. 14, 1994, at 10. In fact, effective management
controls are viewed as the "'unifying theme' " among all regulators addressing deriv-
atives. Becker Calls Management Controls 'Unifying Theme' in Derivatives Response,
26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1301, 1308 (Sept. 30, 1994) (quoting Brandon Becker,
SEC Director of Market Regulation). Federal Reserve Board Governor Susan Phil-
lips echoes the same point, noting that "[s]upervisors of individual institutions must
continue to ensure that senior management of those institutions understand the risks
and are implementing appropriate risk management procedures regarding complex
financial products." Oversight of Derivatives, supra note 78, at 1314.
124. The CFTC has participated in studies and actions taken by other agencies. See
supra note 123. Although CFTC member Joseph Dial, in discussing the Banker's
Trust settlement, stated that "federal regulatory agencies are going to maintain strict
oversight and will take prompt action to deal with improper conduct" as to OTC
derivatives, see Bankers Trust to Settle SEC, CFTC Charges for $10 Mln, Bloomberg
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ers,'- 5 the Chicago Board of Trade and Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change"2 also took action. Overseas, the International Organization
of Securities Commissions, 7 the Hong Kong Securities and Futures
News Service, Dec. 22, 1994, the matter was most remarkable for both Commissions'
care not to address derivatives too broadly. See infra note 179. The Bankers Trust
case was handled as the fraud of one Bank employee. The CFTC's Chairman, Mary
Schapiro, however, who took office on October 13, 1994, has made it clear that the
CFTC is reviewing its current swaps exemption criteria. She stated her concern as
"whether we have drawn the circle [of exemptions] too wide. Do we have partici-
pants in the swaps market who are not sufficiently sophisticated and without sufficient
resources? I'm particularly concerned about municipalities and pension funds." Mary
Schapiro, Regulatory Talk, Compliance Rep., Dec. 12, 1994, at 10.
125. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Notice to Members 94-62, at 387, 388-
90 (Aug. 1994) [hereinafter NASD Notice 94-62]. This Notice provides an excellent
presentation of key issues relating to the sales and pricing of derivatives, including
suitability requirements, that is, a "member's relationship with the customer gives rise
to a duty to help the customer determine" the appropriateness of a given instrument
for that customer. Id at 388. In the face of strong negative comment by the SEC,
however, ("[Commissioner] Roberts remarked that he is inclined to oppose any pro-
posal that would sharply limit the coverage of suitability protection to customers,
even institutional ones.") the NASD announced a hasty retreat. Roberts Discusses
Developments, supra note 117, at 1. Walter Robertson, the NASD's Director of Com-
pliance, explained that "the proposal... will be rewritten to clearly reflect that a
[broker-dealer] has suitability obligations to all investors .... The interpretation will
clarify the different standards some institutional investors may require for evaluating
risk when they develop their own resources to evaluate investment decisions." NASD
To Clarify Suitability Interpretation of 94-62, Compliance Rep., Dec. 12, 1994, at 3
(noting that some members originally interpreted 94-62 to mean that suitability rules
do not apply to institutional customers). See also National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,
NASD Notice to Members 95-21, at 131-34 (Apr. 1995) (requesting comments from
members on the suitability proposal discussed in NASD Notice 94-62, which has since
been substantially redrafted).
126. The MERC is creating an agency to manage collateral for interest-rate swap
dealers and the CBOT may create a clearinghouse to guarantee swaps and other de-
rivatives transactions. These steps, expected to be effected in mid-1995, will address
credit risk in exchange-traded products and will increase competition with OTC deriv-
atives dealers. The MERC has also planned to provide valuations of swap positions
and collateral at current market prices. Steven E. Levingston, CBOT, Chicago Merc
Plan To Better Monitor Swaps, Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1994, at Cl; see supra text accom-
panying note 95 (defining credit risk).
127. IOSCO issued its guidelines, "Operational and Financial Risk Management
Control Mechanisms For Over-the-Counter Derivatives Activities of Regulated Se-
curities Firms," jointly with the Basle Committee in July 1994. Basle Comm. on Bank-
ing Supervision, Joint Press Statement by the Basle Committee and IOSCO Technical
Comm. (July 27, 1994) (on file with author). See also IOSCO Guidance on OTC De-
rivatives, Sec. & Cap. Markets L. Rep., Aug.-Sept. 1994, at 1 [hereinafter IOSCO
Guidance] (noting that the IOSCO paper "recommends operational and risk manage-
ment controls that are considered to be minimum standards which securities regula-
tors should ask derivatives professionals to adopt to manage their risk exposures").
The IOSCO paper highlights several mechanisms for derivatives risk control:
An established framework of risk management policies, procedures and
controls;
market and credit risk management functions independent of the trading
function;
in-house expertise and resources;
use of appropriate risk reduction techniques;
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Commission'28 and the International Swaps and Derivatives Associa-
tion129 all took steps toward reducing the risk of derivatives. This
does not purport to be a complete list.
Notably, beyond certain industry-specific areas such as capital stan-
dards, the approaches taken by these parties toward derivatives deal-
ers and users have been largely process-oriented. Parties' approaches
include activity and examination guidelines, 130 focusing on manage-
ment's ability to control risk' 3' and adequacy of internal controls. 32
More specifically, in the Bankers Trust enforcement agreement, the
Federal Reserve required greater risk disclosure and price informa-
tion. 33 Most significantly, six of Wall Street's largest derivatives deal-
ers voluntarily agreed to make regular disclosures to the SEC and
CFTC about how they manage their derivatives risks.134 These deal-
ers also agreed to give written risk assessments to customers to whom
appropriate valuation and risk exposure measurement techniques;
systems to ensure adequate information and reporting, both internal and ex-
ternal; and
appropriate funding and liquidity policies.
Id.
128. "[T]he SFC intends to issue final guidelines which will represent minimum
best practice for dealers engaged in OTC derivative activities and will then require
firms to demonstrate compliance." IOSCO Guidance, supra note 127, at 1.
129. The ISDA, the trade association of derivatives dealers, is an important ob-
server and source of trade practice in the derivatives market. In fact, the ISDA re-
cently completed a "standard trade confirmation form" for use by counterparties
entering into OTC equity options contracts. Derivatives Group Creates New Confirm,
Redemption Dig. & Sec. Indus. Daily, Nov. 18, 1994, at 1. The purpose of the form is
to address contingencies such as the disappearance of options issuers through merger,
nationalization or bankruptcy. Id.
130. An unnamed "senior reasury Official" acknowledged consistency among the
regulators as to these steps. Administration's Financial Chiefs Report on 80 Actions to
Reduce Derivatives Risk, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1421, 1429-30 (Oct. 28, 1994)
[hereinafter Financial Chiefs Report]; see also Group of Thirty, supra note 118, at 11-
12, 22 (1993) (advocating the use of stress simulations and netting agreements to re-
duce credit risk).
131. "The safe and sound use of derivatives is contingent upon effective board and
senior management oversight." Comptroller's Handbook, supra note 85, at 3.
132. See id. (noting that examiners should review procedures that are designed to
"[d]etermine the effectiveness of controls").
133. Following large losses by Bankers Trust clients Gibson Greetings and Procter
& Gamble, Bankers Trust signed an agreement with the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York requiring Bankers Trust to provide risk analyses and other information on
leveraged derivatives transactions to enable customers to better understand the risks
involved with these products. Steven Lipin & Jeffrey Taylor, Bankers Trust Signs Ac-
cord On Derivatives, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1994, at A3. The accord, a Federal Reserve
enforcement action regarded nearly as severe as a cease-and-desist order, requires
Bankers Trust to provide daily quotes to ensure "reasonable transparency of pricing
and valuation." Id. at A12 (citation omitted); see also New Derivatives Safeguards
Imposed As Bankers Trust, Fed Reach Agreement, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
1649, 1655-56 (Dec. 9, 1994) (discussing how the Fed defines in detail "leveraged de-
rivative transactions" in the accord).
134. Taylor, supra note 26, at Cl.
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they sell derivatives.'35 Sensibly, the purpose of these approaches has
not been to shield market participants from economic risk or to limit
the use of certain derivative products.
B. Bringing Derivatives Under the Existing Regulatory Regime
The introductory example' 36 demonstrates that derivative products
are difficult to categorize under the existing securities laws, and there-
fore, regulating derivatives under the present framework of securities
laws is impractical. Simply stated, the existing regulatory network is
incapable of accommodating derivatives. In addition, a consensus is
forming that well-publicized derivatives-related losses are more a
function of poor management than inadequate regulation or " 'intrin-
sic problems in the [OTC] derivatives market.' "137 The times throw
up a technology: Risk must be marshalled in an era that prizes the
earning power or cash flow of assets higher than the assets themselves
and when economic well-being requires the continued expansion of
world trade. It logically follows that parties' exposure to currency and
interest fluctuations will increase. These developments coincide with
the accepted use of advanced computational power, thus alloving fi-
nancial risk to be divided into any number of discrete components.
These conclusions are evident in an SEC staff comment to the Man-
agement's Discussion and Analysis ("MD&A") section of one public
company's Form 10-K.'1 Noting the company's overseas manufactur-
ing activities and supplier arrangements, the SEC inquired about "the
extent of the company's exposure to currency risk; [and] the mechan-
ics and extent of any foreign currency... hedging arrangements."' 39
Most revealingly, the company was required to "[d]isclose manage-
ment's rationale for any unhedged exposure."'O Indeed, unhedged
135. Id
136. See supra part I.A.
137. See Economists Roundtable, supra note 67, at 2.
138. SEC Form 10-K is part of the integrated disclosure system for public compa-
nies. 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1994) (applicable for annual reports filed pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13, 15(d)). Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K
gives guidance as to completing the Management Discussion and Analysis portion of
periodic filings. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1994) ("Management Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations"). The Commission is considering
clarifying MD&A disclosure of derivatives activities, and commissioners have criti-
cized FASB's voluntary approach to disclosure of quantitative information regarding
derivatives. See Roberts Discusses Developments, supra note 117, at 1.
139. Letter from [Branch Chief], SEC Division of Corporate Finance to [Client]
(Sept. 19,1994). The Commission's belief that as a regulator it can through the disclo-
sure process mandate certain "good" business practices has become so accepted as to
no longer attract comment.
140. Id
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exposure to exchange-rate fluctuation has sparked at least one class-
action lawsuit. 141
However, as one might expect, rationality does not always rule and
the influence of certain interested parties reflects their organizational
biases and traditions. Accordingly, at the moment, both the FASB
and the SEC encourage, but do not require, MD&A disclosure of
quantitative information by issuers about the risks undertaken in their
derivative transactions. 42 The SEC, however, indicated the intensity
of its "encouragement" by commencing an investigation of Gibson
Greetings, because, in the Commission's view, Gibson's derivatives
transactions prior to its losses may have overstated the company's re-
ported net income in 1993.'43 The Commission has mentioned having
all but "plain-vanilla" derivative contracts labeled as securities. It has
also announced new disclosure requirements on mortgage-backed se-
curities confirmations that will now include a "Surgeon General" type
warning: "[Y]ields are subject to fluctuation depending on the speed
in which the underlying note or receivable prepays."u This warning
reminds securities dealers to adhere to high standards in their sales
practices.' 45 To set the enforcement tone, SEC Commissioner Rob-
erts has on two recent occasions referred to derivatives as having been
"'dreamed up more in a boiler room than a conference room.'"146
The SEC is also considering a change in accounting rules to require
publicly traded banks to mark to market 147 unhedged index amortiz-
ing swaps,"4 a $120 billion substitute designed to compensate with
high yields for the prepayment risk of mortgage-backed bonds. 49 Ad-
dressing the same area, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
141. Millman, supra note 40, at 159 & n.7 (reporting that a class-action lawsuit was
fied against Compaq in 1991, alleging that the company "'lacked sufficient and ade-
quate foreign currency hedging mechanisms.'" (citation omitted)).
142. See supra note 117.
143. Gibson itself disclosed the investigation in its 10-Q filing for September 30,
1994. Anderson & Taylor, supra note 9, at C27.
144. Confirmation of Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 34-34962 [1994-1995
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,455, at 85,947 (Nov. 10, 1994) (summa-
rizing amendments to Rule 10b-10). The amended Rule requires broker-dealers to
disclose written information to customers regarding the terms of the transaction,
whether the broker-dealer is an interested party and other relevant facts. Id.
145. See Becker, supra note 123, at 10.
146. Wayne, supra note 6, at D1 (quoting SEC Commissioner Roberts' comments
on the Orange County debacle).
147. See infra note 158.
148. "Index-amortizing swaps are derivatives designed to act as substitutes for
mortgage-backed bonds; their interest and principal payments, which change in line
with interest rates, are devised to behave more predictably than those of actual mort-
gage securities." Schultz & Taylor, supra note 123, at A4. These swaps provide for the
exchange of floating interest-rate payments for fixed-rate payments over time. Unlike
normal swaps, however, the underlying principal in these arrangements decreases
("amortizes") over time, and the rate of decrease speeds up when interest rates fall
and slows when rates rise.
149. See id. (noting that banks hold an estimated $120 billion of these instruments).
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and the Federal Reserve Board have proposed capital regulations that
through haircutting 5 ' would make the most speculative derivatives-
multi-year interest and currency rate derivatives and those tied to
commodity or stock markets-more expensive to dealers. Dealers
have readily accepted this proposal because the regulations would al-
low haircuts to be reduced by hedging over an entire portfolio-the
method used by dealers-rather than one transaction at a time.151
At the same time, the bank regulators have taken what is for them a
radical path. Banking regulation is aimed at institutional safety and
soundness and at the institutional capacity to perform banking func-
tions to protect that industry, rather than at the markets in which
banks function.'-, Yet, in treating derivatives, the banking authorities
are shifting focus. For example, in the Bankers Trust matter, banking
authorities developed and required sales practice rules and suitability
guidelines to protect bank customers.153
In following this traditional securities regulatory practice, the Fed
and the Comptroller of the Currency may have concluded that ex-
isting banking regulation is no longer fitting for banks that have diver-
sified and evolved into financial services companies. Indeed, the
growth of derivatives is evidence of this metamorphosis. The National
Association of Securities Dealers, however, in a rare bow to market-
place realities, recently proposed to relieve dealers' suitability obliga-
tions to institutions that have the "resources and procedures that
provide them with the sophistication to make independent investment
decisions."'" Reality requires that institutions use derivatives to fur-
ther their commercial purposes. Those customers engaging in the
bulk of derivatives transactions do not rely on dealers to help them
"determine reasonable investment parameters." 55 Whether the end-
users' derivatives activities fit their enterprise needs will ultimately de-
pend on their management practices, not on regulatory policy.
While the absence of any current trade reporting system for swaps,
hybrids and structured derivatives positions cannot be ignored, the ex-
otic derivatives that create the most concern are also those that have
severely limited order exposure and trade transparency-necessities
150. "A 'haircut' is a deduction taken in a firm's capital computation in order to
account for specific risks and uncertainty and is enumerated in regulatory capital
rules. It is, in effect, a regulatory reserve." CFrC Report, supra note 2, at 60 n.27.
151. See Keith Bradsher, U.S. To Order Higher Bank Reserves, N.Y. Tunes, Sept. 1,
1994, at D1 (noting that the new regulations are intended to discourage banks from
speculating in derivatives).
152. "Bank regulators are generally described as regulating banks or financial insti-
tutions, not markets." CFTC Report, supra note 2, at 56.
153. SEC Commissioner Roberts, predictably, has praised the federal banking
agencies, noting that "'[t]he notion of protecting bank customers is a responsibility
that bank regulators are stepping up to.'" Meredith, supra note 121, at 1; see also
Wholesale Transactions Code, supra note 26, § 4.3.1. (addressing suitability concerns).
154. NASD Notice 94-62, supra note 125, at 388.
155. Id.
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for accurate pricing. Consequently, because of the complexity of
these instruments, there are wide variances between price quotations
and actual executions. 15 6 As a result, in considering approaches to
control the risks of derivatives, calls for "transparent accounting"' 57 of
derivatives activity and normally effective capital controls like mark-
ing the value of positions to market158 have limited or even illusory
utility.
These shortcomings in the trade reporting system are even more
evident when one considers that, in the words of one enthusiastic ex-
pert, the positions are "managed through... dynamic hedging-an
inexact science that can heighten price movements and produce un-
known consequences."' 59 J.P. Morgan recently made public its meth-
odology for calculating risk on more than three hundred derivatives
tied to securities and currencies in more than fifteen major markets
around the world. It claims that this information allows companies to
understand up to ninety-five percent of the risk of their positions.16
Dealers and end-users also employ sensitivity reports to measure risk
through probability analysis or duration-weighted average models.
Ultimately, however, all is still approximation, "Kentucky windage."
C. Formal Congressional Oversight
Several bills regarding derivatives regulation have been introduced
in Congress recently. For example, Senator Riegle introduced the
"Derivatives Supervision Act of 1994" in the 103d Congress.' 6' The
156. See Kentouris, supra note 32, at 3 (reporting Lester Wigler's discussion of
these variances. Such variances are characteristic of all illiquid securities).
157. See Millman, supra note 40, at 257 (defining transparency as disclosure of risks
to investors in a fund or taxpayers of a municipality); Oversight of Derivatives, supra
note 78, at 1314 (summarizing transparency as a function of proper accounting, re-
porting and disclosure).
158. See Shadow Financial, supra note 89, at 1317-18 (explaining mark-to-market
procedures). OTC derivatives and other illiquid instruments cannot be readily valued
by reference to a secondary market (mark-to-market analysis). Id. Accordingly,
many derivatives are priced by using computer-based models that estimate profits or
losses from the time of purchasing the instrument. Such mark-to-model accounting,
however, is uncertain, because not all models employ the same economic assump-
tions. Id Wigler analyzes the difficulties of mark-to-market procedures with regard to
complex derivatives. See Kentouris, supra note 32, at 3 (noting that mark-to-market
analysis is inadequate because, in an active market with constantly changing values,
rarely will one be able to execute a contract at the mark-to-market value).
159. See Melamed, supra note 61, at 17.
160. Michael R. Sesit, Morgan Unveils the Way It Measures Market Risk, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 11, 1994, at C1 (noting that the release of this proprietary information is "an
aggressive attempt to supply the benchmark by which banks, institutional investors
and corporations measure their risks"). The Bank stated that it released its method
for calculating market risk to increase transparency in markets and to establish a com-
mon standard for measuring risk. Id; see Levingston, supra note 126, at C1 (discussing
the CBOT and the MERC's systems for monitoring OTC derivatives transactions).
161. S. 2291, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (primarily aimed at preventing systemic
market failure).
CHALLENGE OF DERIVATIVES
Federal Reserve Board and other organizations, however, opposed
that legislation, arguing that the existing regulatory framework pro-
vided sufficient information to regulators. 16 As expected, several
bills regarding regulation of derivative securities have been intro-
duced in the 104th Congress.16 3 One such bill, the "Risk Management
Improvement and Derivatives Oversight Act of 19 95 ,I' '1 calls for the
establishment of a "Federal Derivatives Commission,"'1  composed of
members of the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, Securities and Exchange Commission, Commodi-
ties Futures Trading Commission and Secretary of the Treasury, 166 to
"establish principles and standards to improve risk management and
the prudent use of derivative financial instruments by financial
institutions.' '1
67
Opposition to Congressional initiatives has appeared on several
fronts in the last year. For example, Jack Fields, Chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications & Finance, concluded
that there was no need for legislation to address the supervision of
OTC derivatives." After careful study, Deputy Treasury Secretary
Frank Newman "reiterated what federal regulators and industry rep-
resentatives have been saying all year: that banking and securities
regulators have adequate authority to oversee dealers and users of
derivative products and that they already have put substantial guide-
lines in place.' 1 69 Several other groups have voiced opposition to ad-
162. Fed's LaWare Reiterates Stand on Derivatives: No New Laws Needed, Re-
demption Dig. & Sec. Indus. Daily, Nov. 30, 1994, at 2.
163. See, e.g., Risk Management Improvement and Derivatives Oversight Act of
1995, H.R. 20, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (introduced by Rep. Leach). Title IV of
the Bill, denominated the "Derivatives Dealer Self-Regulation Act of 1995," provides
for the "establishment of a self-regulatory organization for the supervision of deriva-
tives dealers," excluding registered broker-dealers and futures commission
merchants. Id. §§ 401-03; see Derivatives Safety and Soundness Supervision Act of
1995, H.R. 31, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (introduced by Rep. Gonzalez) (seeking
to increase oversight of financial institutions that engage in derivatives activity). Rep.
Gonzalez's bill would require the "appropriate federal regulatory agencies to estab-
lish ... substantially similar standards relating to capital, accounting, disclosure, risk
management, and suitability." Id § 101(a).
164. LR. 20, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1995).
165. Id § 101.
166. Id § 102(1).
167. Id. § 104(a).
168. See Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1651, at 3 (Mar. 1, 1995) (Introduction).
169. Financial Chiefs Report, supra note 130, at 1429-30; see Oversight of Deriva-
tives, supra note 78, at 1313 (noting that Federal Reserve Board Governor Phillips
does not believe "that derivatives activities are jeopardizing individual institutions or
the financial system as a whole"). Phillips opposes legislation governing derivatives
because, in her view, the internal controls and risk management techniques developed
thus far will contain derivatives-related risk. Id. at 1314.
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ditional legislation, including Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan.
170
Notably, lawmakers' desire for additional oversight of derivatives is
reminiscent of the calls for "costly regulatory overkill"171 of the
GNMA ("Ginnie Mae")172 market in the early 1980s. Events during
that period closely parallel headlines today concerning derivatives:
Some Ginnie Mae traders were accused of improper trading prac-
tices,173 and there was "speculation inappropriate for financial institu-
tions.' 74  Just as lawmakers today propose a "Federal Derivatives
Commission," Senator Williams proposed the formation of a "Gov-
ernment Securities Rulemaking Board" to monitor Ginnie Mae trad-
ing.'75 Ultimately, however, a prudent regulatory response mooted
the need for more extravagant legislative initiatives: the SEC
"deployed its anti-fraud arsenal against overreaching by dealers, and
the New York Stock Exchange... established margin requirements
applicable to transactions in Ginnie Maes.' 1 76 Government securities
dealers established a system of self-regulation that included suitability
requirements and provided for additional disclosure.177 In addition,
accounting procedures developed to reflect more accurately the value
of Ginnie Mae transactions.1 8 Indeed, the events surrounding the de-
velopment of the GNMA market invite lawmakers today to take a
step back and allow the existing derivatives regulatory apparatus to
establish itself.
With respect to the financial markets, dealers and end-users have
recognized that they are part of the modern world; the world of quan-
tum mechanics and Harold Pinter plays; a world where we do not
know everything about anything; a world of uncertainty. As in all
human endeavors, however, adjustments will be made. Uncertainties
or not, derivatives overlap with the management of enterprise and
commerce and the continuing need to finance the national debt. The
existence of other dealers and experts throughout the world who can
act as counterparties in the United States and the growth of world
170. Melamed, supra note 61, at 15 (citing Greenspan's opposition to "fundamental
changes in regulatory structure"); Derivatives Group, supra note 61, at 5 (reporting
that the International Swaps and Derivatives Association opposes legislation gov-
erning derivatives and attributes large recent losses to "lack of sufficient knowledge of
the products and [lack of] proper disclosure").
171. Sam S. Miller, Regulation in Trading of Ginnie Maes, 21 Duq. L. Rev. 39, 71
(1982).
172. The Government National Mortgage Association ("GNMA") guarantees se-
curities backed by pools of mortgages guaranteed by the Veterans Administration or
insured by the Federal Housing Administration or Farmers Home Administration. Id.
at 39.
173. Id. at 75.
174. Id. at 70.
175. Id. at 89.
176. Id at 77.
177. Id.
178. Id
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trade mean that derivatives will be spared inhibiting legislation,
notwithstanding the consumerist orientation of the SEC and the
states.179 The steps to address perceived concerns will continue to be
incremental, disclosure-oriented, good business practices.' s° There
will be no challenge to the derivative product. No one will threaten
this financially engineered, commercially necessary golden goose. It is
derivatives, however, that pose a challenge to our present regimes of
financial and securities regulation. Securities regulations exist in lay-
ers like an archeological dig, haphazardly created by states, the fed-
eral government, self-regulatory organizations and Congress, each
reacting to whatever "crisis" was at hand.18' Examples of such crises
179. But see Lipin & Taylor, supra note 133, at A3 (quoting William McLucas, di-
rector of the SEC's Enforcement Division speaking about the SEC's Bankers Trust-
Gibson Greetings investigation: "'Some of these instruments have been used so as to
make them fall within the definition of securities'" and "'we're going to say they're
effectively securities.' "); Saul Hansell, Settlement By Bankers Trust Unit, N.Y. Tunes,
Dec. 23, 1994, at D6 (also quoting McLucas, who stated, following the Commission's
settlement with Bankers Trust, that "'[t]his is not a case about the suitability of any
particular securities sold to Gibson, nor is it an action by the S.E.C. which announces
any new regulatory regime with respect to derivatives' "); id. at D6 (noting that the
financial industry and bank regulators had "pressured" the SEC (and CFTC) not to
claim broadened authority over derivatives). See supra notes 123-24. Concerns that
the SEC would, for the first time, claim that swaps were securities and therefore sub-ject to its jurisdiction, were realized in a footnote in the Bankers Trust settlement
release. BT Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 35136 [1994-1995 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,477, at 86,112 n.6 (Dec. 22, 1994). However, the SEC
concurrently issued an order providing relief until September 30, 1995 from broker-
dealer registration regarding certain OTC derivative transactions. Order Exempting
Certain Brokers and Dealers from Broker-Dealer Registration, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 35135, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85.476, at
86,108 (Dec. 22, 1994).
180. This approach is evident in the Wholesale Transactions Code, supra note 26,
and standards for controls that six major derivatives dealers developed in cooperation
with the SEC and CFTC. Taylor, supra note 26, at Cl.
181. Modem American securities regulation began with state blue sky laws, the
first of which was passed in Kansas in 1911. Joseph C. Long, Blue Sky Law § 1.01, at
1-1 & n.1 (1994). These early statutes were rooted in state statutes regulating securi-
ties of common carriers, mines and other industries. Il By 1929, when the stock
market crash precipitated the passage of federal securities laws, all states had some
form of securities regulation. Id The federal securities laws of the 1930s did not pre-
empt state regulation, although they did narrow its impact. See Securities Act of 1933,
Pub. L. No. 22, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L No. 291, ch. 404,48
Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-78hh (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). In
addition, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), Pub.
L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)), is applicable in civil suits for securities fraud. RICO defines "racke-
teering activity" to include any "fraud in the sale of securities" that is "punishable
under any law of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
RICO contains powerful incentives for securities-fraud plaintiffs. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c) (1988) (providing for treble damages, costs and attorneys' fees); Jed S.
Rakoff & Howard W. Goldstein, RICO: Civil and Criminal Law and Strategy
§ 2.02[2], at 2-16 to 2-23 (1st ed. 11th release, 1995).
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in this generation include standardized options in the seventies, 182 re-
pos in the eighties,'83 and the activities of investment advisors to-
day. 14 Indeed, the instinct of regulators is often Luddite, placing
market practice on a matrix of regulatory theory rather than effecting
the lightest layer of regulation that furthers market efficiency. 185
One example of imposing regulatory theory occurred in November
1994, when the SEC amended Rule 10b-10, its confirmation disclosure
regulation, in part to add a "warning label" about certain deriva-
tives.' 86 In so doing, the Commission overturned its own previous
policy as well as decades of securities industry practice. Prior to the
amendment, it was possible for a customer to instruct his broker in
writing not to send him execution reports. 87 Last year, however, a
number of municipalities, after so instructing their brokers, lost
money due to the trading activities of their financial advisor.18 8 Thus,
the rule has been amended. Now, in addition to providing execution
information to the advisor, it requires a broker to supply such infor-
mation to the advised account even if the customer does not want
182. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, Report of the Special Study of the Options
Markets (Dec. 22, 1978) (on file with author) (responding to the Commission's direc-
tive: Investigation of Standardized Options Trading and Regulation of Such Trading,
Exchange Act Release No. 14056 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.(CCH) 81,346 (Oct. 17, 1977)). The Study concluded that there were regulatory
inadequacies in the options markets and made recommendations to improve the regu-
latory framework.
183. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Stein Roe & Farnham, SEC No-Action Letter, Release No. 34-23640,
36 SEC Docket (CCH) 754 (Sept. 24, 1986) (imposing sanctions for improper man-
agement of the Upstate New York Teamster Pension & Welfare Funds); see infra note
187.
185. See CFTC Report, supra note 2, at 56 ("The development of OTC derivative
markets has had to fit into [a] pre-existing regulatory framework.").
186. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
187. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (1994); see New York Stock Exch., Rule 409, N.Y.S.E.
Guide (CCH) 2409, at 3700 (1994) (requiring members to send reports of a cus-
tomer's account only on a quarterly basis).
188. Steven D. Wymer, an investment advisor to several small municipalities, was
sentenced to over 14 years in prison on May 11, 1993, for defrauding his clients. He
was also ordered to pay $91 million in restitution. In a prior SEC civil action arising
under the same facts, Wymer was ordered to return $209 million to his defrauded
clients. Adviser Who Defrauded Municipalities Sentenced to Over 14 Years in Prison,
25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 706 (May. 14, 1993). Wymer later testified before
Congress in connection with a proposed amendment to the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, which would require investment advisors to disclose additional information
to clients and would increase funding for SEC oversight of investment advisors
through fees from registrants and applicants. See Investment Adviser Industry Reform:
Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 4, 1993). The bill at issue, The Investment Adviser Regulatory
Enhancement and Disclosure Act of 1993, H.R. 578, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993),
passed in the House in May 1993, but "was killed in late sessions of the Senate."
Senate Fails to Act After House Passes Investment Adviser Reform Bill, 26 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 1365 (Oct. 14, 1994).
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it.'8 9 This is the SEC as nanny; the regulatory ethic that requires ma-
ture individuals and independent institutions to do something for their
own good, whether or not the parties find it useful.
A second example of imposing regulatory theory involves the
NASD regulation of short sales. NASD is the proprietor of NAS-
DAQ, the largest OTC stock market. 90 That market successfully re-
lies on competing dealers to make markets in securities, rather than
on specialists, as does the New York Stock Exchange.' 9' Although
each of these stock markets has strengths and weaknesses, the public
has been trained to regard only the Exchange as authentic. Therefore,
NASDAQ periodically twists itself into a simulacrum of the Exchange
to give the public unnecessary "comfort." Short-sale' 12 regulation is
one such area. It has long been regarded as vestigial and subversive of
the pricing mechanism. 93 Nevertheless, because the New York Stock
Exchange has such regulation, NASDAQ has recently followed suit to
enhance its competitive position: NASDAQ has implemented an "up-
tick rule";194 it will soon also require short sales to be identified upon
order entry, and there must be proof that the seller can deliver bor-
rowed securities to settle the transaction.'" Thus, the NASD has de-
termined that an audit trail is necessary to evidence that the seller can
borrow to make delivery at the exact moment of order entry. The
NASD requires this information on the order entry report.' 96 In the
recent past, this would have been merely a nuisance. Today, however,
it is impossible. Stock market participants short sell baskets com-
posed of dozens of securities at a time; systems proliferate that auto-
189. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
190. NASDAQ, Inc., a subsidiary of the NASD, operates an electronic inter-dealer
quotation system. V Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 2580 (3d ed.
1990).
191. Id at 2578-79.
192. An investor who expects a stock price to fall executes a short sale by selling
borrowed stock and then buying the stock in the future at a lower price. Jonathan R.
Macey et al., Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and its Role
in View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 Cornell L Rev. 799, 799-800
(1989).
193. For example, an "uptick rule," which permits short sales only in an advancing
market, impedes short selling. Macey, supra note 192, at 800-01. NASDAQ is exempt
from the current uptick rule, Rule 10a-1 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (1994)). Short sales
provide a method by which investors who know that a security is overvalued may
trade on that information, thereby promoting more efficient pricing. Macey, supra
note 192, at 800; see also J. Randall Woolrich, An Economic Analysis of Short Selling
and Security Prices (Sept. 1991) (on file with author) (concluding that an uptick rule is
unnecessary and only increases trading costs and results in higher bid-ask spreads).
194. See supra note 193; Rules of Fair Practice, supra note 23, 1 2200H, art. I
§48.
195. Rules of Fair Practice, supra note 23, 1 2151.04(b)(2), art. IlI, § 1.
196. Id On January 6, 1995, however, NASDAQ delayed implementing this rule
until August 1, 1995. Until then, members are permitted to comply by reviewing lists
transmitted among dealers by facsimile of securities available for borrowing.
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matically execute orders, without assistance from traders. 197
Borrowing is a necessity of a short sale; evidencing that it has been
accomplished amounts to over-regulation.
These and other examples of unnecessary or anti-competitive regu-
lation have, until now, lacked any mechanism of systemic review. One
commentator noted that the ability of unregulated foreign dealers to
act as counterparties in the United States places a "'hole [in] the...
heart of the derivatives market[s].' "19 However, it is the fact that
derivatives markets function internationally, largely beyond the reach
of regulators, which is a hole in the heart of the regulatory structure
(as are derivatives themselves). The system seeks all-encompassing
regulation without regard to cost,199 and until now, market partici-
pants have not objected. As Comptroller General Bowsher stated:
[T]he nature of derivatives activities clearly demonstrates that [the
current regulatory system] has not kept pace with the dramatic and
rapid changes that are occurring in domestic and global financial
markets. Banking, securities, futures, and insurance are no longer
separate and distinct industries that can be well regulated by the
existing patchwork quilt of Federal and State agencies.2 00
CONCLUSION
Recently implemented voluntary compliance systems and the myr-
iad informal approaches to risk reduction indicate the direction that
regulation in this area will proceed, and also provide additional proof
that there is no need for costly and counterproductive federal over-
sight of derivatives. These initiatives signal that derivatives users (and
regulators) receive enough information about derivatives-related risk
197. See, e.g., Portfolio System for Institutional Trading, SEC No-Action Letter
[1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,003 (Dec. 12, 1994) (re-
questing an exemption for institutional customers that trade entire portfolios of stocks
through an electronic order-entry mechanism).
198. Blanc, supra note 1, at 14 (quoting Bank of England, Derivatives: Report of
an Internal Working Group (1993)).
199. The SEC, along with other government agencies, is required under the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified at 44
U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1988)) to consider the costs of proposed regulations. Thus, in
promulgating amendments to Rule 15c2-12-regarding the provision of information
by brokers concerning municipal securities-the Commission "'anticipated that ap-
proximately 12,003 brokers, dealers, municipal securities dealers, issuers of municipal
securities, and nationally-recognized municipal securities information repositories will
spend a total of 95,860 hours complying with Rule 15c2-12 annually.' "SEC Estimates
Compliance Load of New Muni Disclosure Rules, Redemption Dig. & Sec. Indus.
Daily, Dec. 7, 1994, at I (quoting Commission filing with White House Office of Man-
agement and Budget). Without debating the accuracy of the estimate or its cost, to
my knowledge no regulation deemed important by regulators has ever been aban-
doned because of cost borne by the regulated.
200. Risks and Regulation of Financial Derivatives: Hearing Before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 19,
1994) (statement of Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States).
(Vol. 632028
1995] CHALLENGE OF DERIVATIVES 2029
to make informed decisions. In addition, commentators continue to
conclude that recent derivatives-related losses stem from poor man-
agement rather than from problems intrinsic in derivatives markets or
from inadequate regulatory oversight. Indeed, the dramatic growth of
derivatives over the past few years has changed the context of finan-
cial regulation. Notwithstanding the many risks inherent in deriva-
tives, their importance to commerce insures for the first time that the
costs that regulation places on the use of information are being ques-
tioned. The challenge of derivatives, ultimately, is to regulatory
extravagance.

